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U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

[Redacted]

File: [Redacted] Office: MIAMI, FL

Date: MAY 17 2001

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

Application: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(i)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT: [Redacted]

Identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

Public Copy

INSTRUCTIONS:


This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS


Robert P. Wiemann, Acting Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Miami, Florida, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Pakistan who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation in December 1990. The applicant married a citizen of the United States in December 1997 and is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative. He seeks the above waiver in order to remain in the United States and reside with his spouse.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel requests that all of the relevant equities be considered in making a determination on the applicant's waiver request and states that to do otherwise would constitute an abuse of discretion. Counsel asserts that the applicant has not engaged in a pattern of immigration fraud and has not misrepresented the facts in any matters pending with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Counsel asserts that a review of the factors presented clearly establish that the applicant's request warrants a favorable exercise of discretion.

The record reflects that the applicant procured admission into the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor by presenting a fraudulent passport.

Section 212(a) of the Act states:

CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.-
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

* * *

(6) ILLEGAL ENTRANTS AND IMMIGRATION VIOLATORS.-

* * *

(C) MISREPRESENTATION.-

(i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other

benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act states:

ADMISSION OF IMMIGRANT INADMISSIBLE FOR FRAUD OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT. -

(1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a) (6) (C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Sections 212(a) (6) (C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a § 212(a) (6) (C) (i) violation due to passage of time. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered. See Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996; A.G. 1997).

If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. Matter of George and Lopez-Alvarez, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); Matter of Leveque, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

In 1986, Congress expanded the reach of the ground of inadmissibility in the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, P.L. No. 99-639, and redesignated as § 212(a) (6) (C) of the Act by the Immigration Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-649, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 5067) effective June 1, 1991. Congress imposed the statutory bar on (a) those who made oral or written misrepresentations in seeking admission into the United States; (b) those who have made material misrepresentations in seeking entry admission into the United States or "other benefits" provided under the Act; and (c) it made the amended statute applicable to the receipt of visas by, and the admission of, aliens occurring after the date of the enactment based on fraud or misrepresentation occurring before, on, or after such date.

In 1990, § 274C of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1324c, was inserted by the Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 5059), effective for persons or entities that have committed violations on or after November 29, 1990. Section 274C(a) provided penalties for document fraud stating that "[i]t is unlawful for any person or entity knowingly-... (2) to use, attempt to use, possess, obtain, accept, or receive or to provide any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document in order to satisfy any requirement of this Act,...."

In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (P.L. 103-322, September 13, 1994), which enhanced the criminal penalties of certain offenses, including 18 U.S.C. 1546:

(a)...Impersonation in entry document or admission application; evading or trying to evade immigration laws using assumed or fictitious name...knowingly making false statement under oath about material fact in immigration application or document. . . .

(b) Knowingly using false or unlawfully issued document or false attestation to satisfy the Act provision on verifying whether employee is authorized to work.

The penalty for a violation under (a) increased from up to five years imprisonment or a fine, or both, to up to ten years imprisonment or a fine, or both. The penalty for a violation under (b) increased from up to two years imprisonment or a fine, or both, to up to five years imprisonment or a fine, or both.

After reviewing the amendments to the Act and to other statutes regarding fraud and misrepresentation from 1957 to the present time, and after noting the increased impediments Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar, eliminating alien parents of U.S. citizens and resident aliens as applicants and eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

To recapitulate, the record clearly reflects that the applicant knowingly obtained a Pakistan passport in another person's name and used that document to gain admission into the United States by fraud and willful misrepresentation. After his fraudulent entry, the applicant remained longer than authorized and was employed without permission. He subsequently married a United States citizen.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from § 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a

qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for § 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, Interim Decision 3380 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to § 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

In Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.

The court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant and his spouse own a retail business and that the applicant is the sole provider of income for the couple's household. The applicant operates all facets of the couple's business and it could not exist without the applicant's presence and involvement.

Counsel's assertion that the applicant's spouse would suffer financially without the applicant's presence is contradicted by the fact that, pursuant to § 213A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1183a, and the regulations at 8 C.F.R. 213a, the person who files an application for an immigrant visa or for adjustment of status on or after December 19, 1997 must execute a Form I-864 (Affidavit of Support) which is legally enforceable in behalf of a beneficiary (the applicant) who is an immediate relative or a family-sponsored immigrant when an applicant applies for an immigrant visa. The statute and the regulations do not provide for an alien beneficiary to execute an affidavit of support in behalf of a U.S. citizen or resident alien petitioner. Therefore, a claim that an alien beneficiary is needed for the purpose of supporting a citizen or resident alien petitioner can only be considered as a hardship in rare instances.

On appeal, counsel also states that the spouse relies upon the applicant to provide her with daily insulin shots, transport her to medical appointments, prepare the couple's meals, handle the

household chores, and assist her with dressing and other daily hygienic care. Documentation submitted on appeal establishes that the applicant's spouse has a history of medical problems pre-dating her marriage to the applicant. She is obese, has been diabetic for over fifteen years and has been on insulin since 1992 to treat her diabetes. She had surgery for gallstones and an umbilical hernia in 1987, and for additional hernias in 1992. In 1994, she was involved in an automobile accident which resulted in a diagnosis of symptoms associated with degenerative disc disease. One month after her marriage to the applicant, she was declared disabled retroactively to September 1996.

While the medical needs of the applicant's spouse are indeed unfortunate, the evidence submitted indicates that they are long-standing. The applicant and his spouse were aware both of the spouse's medical problems, as well as the applicant's unlawful status, when they married in 1997.

It is noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in Matter of Tijam, Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998), need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. The applicant in the present matter entered the United States in 1990 by fraud and married his spouse in 1997. He now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. However, as previously noted, a consideration of the Attorney General's discretion is applicable only after extreme hardship has been established.

When considered in its totality, the evidence presented fails to show that the qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship as a result of the applicant's removal from the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Matter of T-S-Y-, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.