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U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
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Washington, D.C. 20536

Identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy



File: [Redacted]

Office: SAN FRANCISCO, CA

Date:

13 DEC 2001

IN RE: Applicant:



Application:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under
Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. 1182(i)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



Public Copy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office



DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, San Francisco, California, and a subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Associate Commissioner for Examinations. The matter is now before the Associate Commissioner on a motion to reopen and reconsider. The motion will be granted and the order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed. The application will be denied.

The applicant is a native and citizen of India who was found to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation in 1989. The applicant is the unmarried son of a naturalized United States citizen father and is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative. He seeks the above waiver in order to obtain status as a lawful permanent resident of the United States.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. The Associate Commissioner affirmed that decision on appeal.

On motion, counsel submits a brief and evidence in support of the applicant's request. Counsel states that the documentation was previously submitted on appeal but was not contained in the record of proceeding at the time the Associate Commissioner entered his decision. Counsel requests that the exhibits and legal argument be reviewed so that the applicant may have a fair and just evaluation of his application.

The record reflects that the applicant procured admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation in 1989 by presenting a passport and visa in an assumed name. He obtained the fraudulent documentation after having been rejected issuance of a nonimmigrant visa in his true name on three occasions. The applicant's failure to disclose the true facts regarding his identity upon application for admission cut off lines of inquiry which were relevant to his eligibility for admission.

Section 212(a) of the Act states:

CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.-
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

* * *

(6) ILLEGAL ENTRANTS AND IMMIGRATION VIOLATORS.-

* * *

(C) MISREPRESENTATION.-

(i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act states:

ADMISSION OF IMMIGRANT INADMISSIBLE FOR FRAUD OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT.-

(1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) violation due to passage of time. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered. See Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996, A.G. 1997).

If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. Matter of George and Lopez-Alvarez, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); Matter of Leveque, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

In 1986, Congress expanded the reach of the ground of inadmissibility for fraud or willful misrepresentation in the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, P.L. No. 99-639, and redesignated it as section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act by the Immigration Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-649, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 5067). Congress imposed a statutory bar on (a) those who made oral or written misrepresentations in seeking admission into the

United States; (b) those who have made material misrepresentations in seeking entry admission into the United States or "other benefits" provided under the Act; and (c) it made the amended statute applicable to the receipt of visas by, and the admission of, aliens occurring after the date of the enactment based on fraud or misrepresentation occurring before, on, or after such date.

In 1990, section 274C of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1324c, was inserted by the Immigration Act of 1990, effective for persons or entities that have committed violations on or after November 29, 1990. Section 274C(a) provided penalties for document fraud stating that "[i]t is unlawful for any person or entity knowingly-...(2) to use, attempt to use, possess, obtain, accept, or receive or to provide any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document in order to satisfy any requirement of this Act,...."

In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (P.L. 103-322, September 13, 1994), which enhanced the criminal penalties of certain offenses, including 18 U.S.C. 1546:

(a)...Impersonation in entry document or admission application; evading or trying to evade immigration laws using assumed or fictitious name...knowingly making false statement under oath about material fact in immigration application or document. . . .

(b) Knowingly using false or unlawfully issued document or false attestation to satisfy the Act provision on verifying whether employee is authorized to work.

The penalty for a violation under (a) increased from up to five years imprisonment or a fine, or both, to up to ten-years imprisonment or a fine, or both. The penalty for a violation under (b) increased from up to two-years imprisonment or a fine, or both, to up to five years imprisonment or a fine, or both.

In 1996, Congress expanded the document fraud liability to those who engage in document fraud for the purpose of obtaining a benefit under the Act. Congress also restricted section 212(i) of the Act in a number of ways. Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.

In 1996, Congress also added a ground of inadmissibility for an alien who falsely claims to be a U.S. citizen for any purpose under the Act, including the Act's employment authorization attestation requirements, or under any other federal or state law. This provision applies to false representations of citizenship made on or after September 30, 1996. By its plain language, this ground requires a showing that the false representation was made for a specific purpose: to satisfy a legal requirement or to obtain a benefit that would not be available to a noncitizen. This

requirement also suggests that the individual must know that the representation is false.

After reviewing the amendments to the Act and to other statutes regarding fraud and misrepresentation from 1957 to the present time, and after noting the increased penalties Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar and eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for section 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, Interim Decision 3380 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

In Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.

The court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

The record contains a statement from the applicant's father indicating that he will suffer financial, emotional, and physical hardship if his son is removed from the United States. The father claims that he needs the applicant to attend to his medical problems because his wife and younger son in the United States are unable to cope. In addition, the father indicates that he could not manage his business without the applicant's assistance.

On motion, counsel states that the applicant would not have

travelled to the United States with an assumed name if it had not been for his father's health. Counsel states that the father needs the applicant in the United States for emotional support and to run his business while he is ill.

On motion, counsel resubmits various documents regarding the father's medical problems which were included in the record of proceeding at the time of the Associate Commissioner's decision to dismiss the applicant's appeal. The applicant's father suffers from a variety of medical problems including obesity, headaches, diabetes, muscle aches, and chest pain. No clear evidence as to the specific nature and extent of the father's medical problems or the diagnosis or prognosis of his conditions has been submitted. Based on the information contained in the record, the medical problems of the applicant's father are not indicated to be significant conditions of health, there is no indication that the applicant's presence is integral to his care and treatment, and there is no evidence that suitable medical care is unavailable abroad.

A review of the factors presented, and the aggregate effect of those factors, indicates that the applicant's father would suffer hardship due to separation. The applicant has failed, however, to show that the qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal disruptions involved in the departure of a family member. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing the favorable or unfavorable exercise of the Attorney General's discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Matter of T-S-Y-, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed. The application will be denied.

ORDER: The Associate Commissioner's order dated May 25, 2001 dismissing the appeal is affirmed. The application is denied.