



# H2

U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS  
425 Eye Street N.W.  
ULLB, 3rd Floor  
Washington, D.C. 20536



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prevent clearly unwarranted  
invasion of personal privacy

File: [Redacted] Office: MIAMI, FLORIDA

Date: **JAN 03 2002**

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

Application: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under  
Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8  
U.S.C. 1182(i)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



## Public Copy

**INSTRUCTIONS:**


This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,  
EXAMINATIONS

  
Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Miami, Florida, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Japan who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured a visa and admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant is married to a United States citizen and seeks the above waiver in order to remain in the United States and reside with her spouse.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application as a matter of discretion.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the district director failed to properly consider the factors weighing in the applicant's favor and never considered whether to grant the applicant's request as a matter of discretion. On appeal, counsel requests an additional sixty days in which to submit a brief and/or evidence in support of the appeal. Since counsel has not shown good cause for his request and more than seven months have passed and no new information or documentation has been received, a decision will be rendered based on the present record.

The record reflects that the applicant procured a fiancee visa on July 29, 1998 and used that visa to procure admission into the United States on August 4, 1998 as a nonimmigrant fiancee. The applicant procured the visa and admission through fraud or willful misrepresentation in that she was already in fact married to her spouse at the time of visa issuance and admission into the United States as a fiancee. The applicant's failure to disclose the true facts regarding her marital status cut off lines of inquiry which were relevant to her eligibility for nonimmigrant fiancee status.

Section 212(a) of the Act states:

CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.-  
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

\* \* \*

(6) ILLEGAL ENTRANTS AND IMMIGRATION VIOLATORS.-

\* \* \*

(C) MISREPRESENTATION.-

(i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act states:

ADMISSION OF IMMIGRANT INADMISSIBLE FOR FRAUD OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT.-

(1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

In 1986, Congress expanded the reach of the ground of inadmissibility for fraud or willful misrepresentation in the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, P.L. No. 99-639, and redesignated it as section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act by the Immigration Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-649, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 5067). Congress imposed a statutory bar on (a) those who made oral or written misrepresentations in seeking admission into the United States; (b) those who have made material misrepresentations in seeking entry admission into the United States or "other benefits" provided under the Act; and (c) it made the amended statute applicable to the receipt of visas by, and the admission of, aliens occurring after the date of the enactment based on fraud or misrepresentation occurring before, on, or after such date.

In 1990, section 274C of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1324c, was inserted by the Immigration Act of 1990, effective for persons or entities that have committed violations on or after November 29, 1990. Section 274C(a) provided penalties for document fraud stating that "[i]t is unlawful for any person or entity knowingly- . . . (2) to use, attempt to use, possess, obtain, accept, or receive or to provide any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document in order to satisfy any requirement of this Act, . . . ."

In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law

Enforcement Act (P.L. 103-322, September 13, 1994), which enhanced the criminal penalties of certain offenses, including 18 U.S.C. 1546:

(a) . . . Impersonation in entry document or admission application; evading or trying to evade immigration laws using assumed or fictitious name . . . knowingly making false statement under oath about material fact in immigration application or document . . . .

(b) Knowingly using false or unlawfully issued document or false attestation to satisfy the Act provision on verifying whether employee is authorized to work.

The penalty for a violation under (a) increased from up to five years imprisonment or a fine, or both, to up to ten years imprisonment or a fine, or both. The penalty for a violation under (b) increased from up to two years imprisonment or a fine, or both, to up to five years imprisonment or a fine, or both.

In 1996, Congress expanded the document fraud liability to those who engage in document fraud for the purpose of obtaining a benefit under the Act. Congress also restricted section 212(i) of the Act in a number of ways. Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) violation due to passage of time. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered. See Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996, A.G. 1997).

If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. Matter of George and Lopez-Alvarez, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); Matter of Leveque, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

After reviewing the amendments to the Act and to other statutes regarding fraud and misrepresentation from 1957 to the present time, and after noting the increased impediments Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar, eliminating alien parents of U.S. citizens and resident aliens as applicants and eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for section 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, Interim Decision 3380 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

In Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation.

The court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

The record includes a statement from the applicant indicating that her spouse will relocate with her to Japan if her waiver request is denied. She states that her spouse has no family in Japan and would be unable to find employment there that pays him what he currently earns. In addition, the applicant states that her spouse has custody of his thirteen-year-old son and that if her husband must relocate to Japan he would have to either leave the son in the United States with the child's biological mother, who the applicant alleges is unfit to care for the child, or take the child to Japan where he does not speak the language.

There are no laws that require the applicant's spouse (or step-son) to leave the United States and live abroad. Further, the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994). In Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right

either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

A review of the factors presented, and the aggregate effect of those factors, indicates that the applicant has failed to show that her spouse (the only qualifying relative in this matter) would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal disruptions involved in the removal of a family member. Hardship to the applicant herself or her step-son is not a consideration in section 212(i) proceedings. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Matter of T-S-Y-, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.