




U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street, N.W.
SULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

Identifying
prevent clearly
warranted
invasion of personal privacy



File: [Redacted] Office: SAN FRANCISCO, CA

Date: JAN 06 2003

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

Application: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under
Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. 1182(i)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



PUBLIC COPY

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, San Francisco, California, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of the Philippines who was found by the district director to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured a visa and admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant is married to a United States citizen and is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative. He seeks the above waiver in order to remain in the United States and reside with his spouse and step-children.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the applicant's spouse suffers from recently diagnosed diabetes and chronic muscle pain; depends on the applicant to help her care for her mother, who is ill with diabetes and Alzheimer's; and that the applicant's spouse will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant is removed from the United States.

The record reflects that the applicant misrepresented his marital status as married, when in fact he was single at the time, when procuring a nonimmigrant visa for the United States on February 6, 1991. He then presented the nonimmigrant visa to an immigration officer when applying for admission into the United States on March 16, 1991. The applicant's failure to disclose the true facts regarding his marital status cut off lines of inquiry which were relevant to his eligibility for a visa and for admission into the United States. Subsequent to his entry, the applicant remained longer than authorized and was employed without Service permission.

Section 212(a) of the Act states:

CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.-
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

* * *

(6) ILLEGAL ENTRANTS AND IMMIGRATION VIOLATORS.-

* * *

(C) MISREPRESENTATION.-

(i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act states:

ADMISSION OF IMMIGRANT INADMISSIBLE FOR FRAUD OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT.-

(1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) violation due to passage of time. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered. See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999).

If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. Matter of George and Lopez-Alvarez, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); Matter of Leveque, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for section 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, supra, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

The record reflects that the applicant and his spouse, also a native of the Philippines who obtained United States citizenship through her parents, were married on September 21, 1997. The spouse has two adult children from a prior relationship who were born in the United States in 1977 and 1979. The record contains a declaration from the applicant's spouse asserting that she does not want to be separated from the applicant because they both are getting older and have plans for the future; that separation would mean financial hardship because they have to find a new place to live where the rent will be higher; and that someone needs to look after her elderly mother.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and documentation including affidavits from the applicant, his spouse, and his mother-in-law; letters of support from the applicant's step-children, brother-in-law, pastor, landlord, employer, friends, colleagues, neighbors, spouse's relatives, and spouse's employer; photographs; and information concerning the couple's finances. The documentation submitted indicates that the applicant's spouse has chronic muscle pain as a result of a work-related injury sustained four years ago and was recently diagnosed with diabetes for which she is receiving treatment. Statements indicate that the applicant has been a tremendous help in providing physical and emotional support to his spouse during this difficult time.

The applicant recently obtained full-time employment as a maintenance worker at the same hotel where his spouse has worked for the past fourteen years. Counsel asserts that if the applicant's spouse were to relocate to the Philippines with the applicant, it is unlikely she would be able to afford the cost of her medical care, which she currently receives under her employer-sponsored health insurance in the United States.

The record further reflects that the applicant's spouse has numerous relatives residing in the United States. Her mother, who lives with the couple, is elderly, suffers from multiple health problems including Alzheimer's, diabetes, peptic ulcer, and

arthritis, and relies upon the couple to provide her with round-the-clock care. In addition, the spouse's adult son resides with the couple and her daughter, who is single, is expecting her third child and requires financial assistance.

The court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

In Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation.

There are no laws that require the applicant's spouse to depart the United States and live abroad. Further, the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994). In Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that his spouse (the only qualifying relative in this matter) would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in the removal of a family member. Hardship to the applicant's adult step-children and mother-in-law is not a consideration in section 212(i) proceedings. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Matter of T-S-Y-, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.