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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
20 Mass, Rm. A3042, 425 I Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20536



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

[Redacted]

FILE:

[Redacted]

Office: CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Date:

APR 08 2004

IN RE:

Applicant:

[Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

*Handwritten signature of Robert P. Wiemann*

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Chicago, Illinois and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having sought to procure admission into the United States by fraud and willful misrepresentation of a material fact on January 21, 1985. On March 22, 1991, the applicant married a lawful permanent resident and he is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) in order to remain in the United States and reside with his now naturalized U.S. citizen spouse and children.

The District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative. The application was denied accordingly. *See District Director Decision* dated April 24, 2001. On June 15, 2001, the applicant filed a motion to reconsider with the district director. The motion to reconsider was denied by the District Director on January 14, 2003, and counsel filed an appeal with the AAO.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

- (1) The Attorney General (now the Secretary of Homeland Security, [Secretary]) may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

After reviewing the amendments to the Act regarding fraud and misrepresentation and after noting the increased impediments Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar, eliminating alien parents of U.S. citizens and resident aliens as applicants and eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

To recapitulate, the record clearly reflects and the applicant admitted that on January 23, 1985, he knowingly used an Alien Registration Card (Form I-551) that did not belong to him in an attempt to gain admission into the United States by fraud and willful misrepresentation of a material fact. Therefore the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In the present case, the applicant must demonstrate extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse.

*Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

On appeal, counsel asserts that Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) failed to correctly assess extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse and children. In addition counsel asserts that the district director erred in stating that the applicant was convicted for shoplifting, since he was sentenced to supervision, and supervision is not a conviction in the State of Illinois. Furthermore, counsel states that the District Director erred as a matter of law in denying the waiver application and that he failed to properly weigh the applicant's misrepresentation offense and petty offenses of retail theft and traffic violations against favorable equities in deciding to deny the waiver.

The AAO finds that counsel's assertions are unsubstantiated since the district director found the applicant inadmissible for fraud and willful misrepresentation of a material fact and not for his conviction of shoplifting or for his traffic violations. The District Director denied the waiver application because the applicant did not prove that extreme hardship would be imposed on his qualifying relative.

In his brief counsel states that the applicant and his spouse (Ms. [REDACTED]) own a house together and that he is the sole provider for the family. In the brief it is also stated that Ms. [REDACTED] may be forced to leave the United States and relocate with her children to Mexico if her husband is forced to leave the country. Counsel states that due to general country conditions in Mexico, Ms. [REDACTED] and her children would suffer economic hardship and since the applicant's children were born in the United States, they would suffer hardship if they were to relocate to Mexico with the applicant. In the present case the record reflects that Ms. [REDACTED] is a native of Mexico. No reason was provided, other than economic hardship, as to why Ms. [REDACTED] would not be able to adjust to life in Mexico if she were to relocate with the applicant. No evidence was presented to show that if the applicant were removed from the United States that Ms. [REDACTED] would be impacted at a level commensurate with extreme hardship.

There are no laws that require Ms. [REDACTED] her children to leave the United States and live abroad. In *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F. 2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States." The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather

represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See *Shoostary v. INS*, 39 F. 3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).

As mentioned, section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the qualifying family member, citizen or lawfully resident *spouse or parent* of such alien. Congress specifically did not mention extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen or resident child. Counsel's assertions regarding the hardship the applicant's children would suffer will thus not be considered.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *Hassan v. INS*, *supra*, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. The U.S. Supreme Court additionally held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality reflects that the applicant has failed to show that his U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he were removed from the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.