


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



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FILE:



Office: SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA

Date: **DEC 23 2004**

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of the Philippines who procured admission into the United States on May 29, 1996, by presenting fraudulent documents in another person's name. The applicant is therefore inadmissible to the United States pursuant to § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). The applicant is married to a naturalized U.S. citizen and is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative. She seeks the above waiver under § 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen husband, and denied the application accordingly. On appeal, counsel discusses the difficulties the applicant's husband would undergo should he decide to return to the Philippines with the applicant. Counsel writes about the applicant's husband's job, his purchase of a house, their U.S. citizen child, and how much the applicant's husband would suffer if the applicant were removed. Counsel maintains that the district director's decision failed to consider all the relevant facts.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

- (1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.
- (2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Congress' desire in recent years to limit, rather than extend the relief available to aliens who have committed fraud or misrepresentation is clear. In 1986, Congress expanded the reach of the grounds of inadmissibility in the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, and redesignated as section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act by the Immigration Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-649, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 5067). The Act of 1990 imposed a statutory bar on those who make oral or written misrepresentations in seeking admission into the United States and on those who make material misrepresentations in seeking admission into the United States or in seeking "other benefits" provided under the Act.

In 1990, section 274C of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c. was added by the Immigration Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-649, *supra*) for persons or entities that have committed violations on or after November 29, 1990. Section 274C(a) states that it is unlawful for any person or entity knowingly “[t]o use, attempt to use, possess, obtain, accept, or receive or to provide any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document in order to satisfy any requirement of this Act.”

Moreover, in 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (Pub. L. No. 103-322, September 13, 1994) which enhanced the criminal penalties of certain offenses, including:

- (a) [I]mpersonation in entry document or admission application; evading or trying to evade immigration laws using assumed or fictitious name . . . *See 18 U.S.C. § 1546.*

In this case, the applicant knowingly utilized a fraudulent passport with a visa in an assumed name in order to procure admission into the United States in violation of § 212(a)(6)(C).

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from § 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for § 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996). For example, *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 568-69 (BIA 1999) held that the underlying fraud or misrepresentation may be considered as an adverse factor in adjudicating a § 212(i) waiver application in the exercise of discretion.

In *Cervantes-Gonzalez*, *supra*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to § 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *See Cervantes-Gonzalez* at 565-566.

In this case, the applicant’s qualifying relative is her U.S. citizen spouse. Counsel asserts that the applicant’s husband would suffer extreme hardship in that he would be separated from his father and siblings if he moved to the Philippines with the applicant. In addition, he would not earn much money in the Philippines, because he would not be able to practice his profession of nursing there. The AAO notes that the applicant’s husband resided in the Philippines until he was approximately 18 years old; thus, he is familiar with the language and culture of that country. Also, the record does not show that the applicant’s husband would be unable to work in the Philippines, or that he would be unable to obtain the additional training that counsel asserts is necessary for him to practice nursing in the Philippines. The record does not demonstrate that the applicant’s husband would suffer extreme hardship if he chose to return to the Philippines with the applicant.

Counsel also contends that if the applicant's husband remains in the U.S., he will be separated from his wife, he will lose the assistance her income provides, and it will be difficult for him to care for their five-year-old daughter alone. The record contains financial documents, but there is no evidence that the applicant's husband would be unable to make necessary lifestyle and budget adjustments in her absence. Also, while counsel notes that the applicant's husband becomes severely depressed at the mere thought of separating from the applicant, there is no medical evidence to support this contention.

In *Cervantes-Gonzalez* the Board cited *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970) (citations omitted), stating that:

[E]ven assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States. *Cervantes-Gonzalez* at 567.

Moreover, in *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. The U.S. Supreme Court additionally held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that her U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in the removal of a family member. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.