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U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

[Redacted]

FILE: [Redacted]

Office: LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Date: JUN 3 2004

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Interim District Director, Los Angeles, California and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Paraguay who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative filed by his U.S. citizen spouse. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), so that he may remain in the United States and reside with his U.S. citizen spouse and child.

The Interim District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed upon his qualifying family members. The application was denied accordingly. *See Interim District Director's Decision* dated June 30, 2003.

On appeal, the applicant counsel asserts that Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) misapplied the extreme hardship standard set forth in section 212(h) of the Act, and that the evidence in the record establishes extreme hardship to the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse and child.

Section 212(a)(2) of the Act states in pertinent part, that:

(A)(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

. . . .

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(h) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs (A)(i)(I) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if -

. . . .

(1) (B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . . .

The record reflects that on June 4, 1991, in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, the applicant was found guilty of the offense of Grand Theft in violation of Penal Code 487.1. He was sentenced to 365 days imprisonment and three years probation. The applicant is, therefore, inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Act due to his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (grand theft).

Section 212(h) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be

considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See *Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In the present case, the applicant must demonstrate extreme hardship to his U.S. children or child.

*Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the BIA deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

On appeal, counsel submits a February 16, 1999, decision by the Municipal/Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles that granted the applicant's petition to expunge his prior conviction.

Notwithstanding the court's decision to expunge the applicant's offense, he was convicted of grand theft. Under the statutory definition of "conviction" provided at section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) no effect is to be given in immigration proceedings to a state action which purports to expunge, dismiss, cancel, vacate, discharge, or otherwise remove a guilty plea or other record of guilt or conviction by operation of a state rehabilitative statute. Once an alien is subject to a "conviction" as that term is defined at section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, the alien remains convicted for immigration purposes notwithstanding a subsequent state action purporting to erase the original determination of guilt through a rehabilitative procedure. See *Matter of Roldan-Santoyo*, I&N Dec. 3377 (BIA 1999). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a State Court action setting aside a theft conviction under a rehabilitative scheme did not eliminate the immigration consequences of that offense. *Murillo-Espinoza v. INS*, 261 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore the court's decision to expunge the applicant's offense cannot be considered.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief in which he states that the applicant has shown rehabilitation and has not gotten into any mischief since his conviction in 1991. In addition counsel states that the waiver application should have been granted based on the overwhelming evidence. In an affidavit submitted by the applicant's spouse [REDACTED] she states that she and the applicant waited to start a family until they felt they could provide a positive and stable environment for their child. [REDACTED] further states that she would hate to see her son in a situation where he would have to be separated from his father. Furthermore, she states that it would be emotionally devastating for her if the applicant were to be removed from the United States because they have bought a house together and have two relatively productive businesses.

The record of proceedings does not make it clear whether the applicant's spouse and child will follow him to Paraguay if he were removed. If the applicant is removed to Paraguay his U.S. spouse and child would suffer hardship, but there is no indication that this will impact them at a level commensurate with extreme hardship. If Ms. Jimenez-Sosa and her child were to accompany the applicant to Paraguay, it would be expected that some economic, linguistic and cultural difficulties will arise. No evidence exists that Ms. Jimenez-Sosa and her child would not be able to adjust to life in Paraguay if they were to relocate with the applicant.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991). For example, *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *Hassan v. INS*, *supra*, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. The U.S. Supreme Court additionally held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

A review of the all the factors presented, and the aggregate effect of those factors, indicates that the applicant's family members would suffer hardship due to separation. The applicant has failed, however, to show that his qualifying relatives would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal social and economic disruptions involved if the applicant was not permitted to remain in the United States at this time. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.