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**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**



FILE: [Redacted] Office: SAN FRANCISCO, CA Date: JUN 8 2004

IN RE: [Redacted]

PETITION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



**INSTRUCTIONS:**

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert P. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, San Francisco, California. A subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The matter is now before the AAO on a motion to reconsider. The motion will be granted, the appeal will be dismissed and the previous decisions of the District Director and the AAO will be affirmed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Peru who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant married a native of Peru and naturalized citizen of the United States on May 8, 1999 and is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), so that she may reside in the United States with her husband and children.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated July 22, 2002. The decision was affirmed by the AAO on appeal. *Decision of the AAO*, dated May 1, 2003.

On motion to reconsider, counsel asserts that the decision of the AAO mistakenly stated that the applicant's child resides with the applicant's employer. Counsel indicates that the documentation provided includes a letter from the applicant describing why her daughter continues to attend school in San Carlos, California and a letter from a clinical social worker. *Motion to Reconsider*, dated June 2, 2003. The AAO notes that the indicated letters are not provided in the record. The entire record was considered in rendering a decision on the motion to reconsider.

The record reflects that on June 10, 1992, the applicant was convicted of Petty Theft and was sentenced to two days in jail and 18 months of probation. On October 12, 1995, the applicant was convicted of Petty Theft and was sentenced to 4 days in jail and 18 months of probation. On March 9, 1999, the applicant was convicted of Petty Theft with Prior Convictions and was sentenced to 30 days in jail and two years of probation.

8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2) (2002) states in pertinent part:

A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be provided in the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence.

8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3) (2002) states in pertinent part:

A motion to reconsider must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions to establish that the decision was based on an incorrect application of law or Service [now Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)] policy. A motion to reconsider a decision on an application or petition must, when filed, also establish that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence of record at the time of the initial decision.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude . . . or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception – Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if –

(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was committed . . . more than 5 years before the date of application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States . . .

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if -

....

(1)(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . .

A section 212(h) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse, child or parent of the applicant. Any hardship suffered by the applicant herself is irrelevant to waiver proceedings under section 212(h) of the Act. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

*Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-566 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the Board of Immigration Appeals deems relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

On motion to reconsider, counsel contends that the applicant and her daughter have a close relationship. *Motion to Reconsider*. Counsel states that the AAO and the District Director are mistaken in asserting that the applicant's child lives with the applicant's employer in order to attend school in a location remote from

the applicant's home. *Id.* Counsel, however, fails to establish how this fact alone serves to overcome the previous failure of the record to establish extreme hardship suffered by the applicant's spouse and children.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, in *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), the BIA held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship. The AAO recognizes that the applicant's father and children may endure hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. However, their situation, based on the record, is typical to individuals separated as a result of deportation or exclusion and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship.

The applicant fails to provide evidence that was not available previously and could not have been discovered during the prior proceedings under this application. Further, the applicant fails to establish that the prior decision of the AAO was based on an incorrect application of law or Citizenship and Immigration Services policy.

The applicant in this case has failed to identify any erroneous conclusion of law or statement of fact in her appeal. In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the previous decisions of the district director and the AAO will not be disturbed.

**ORDER:** The motion is granted. The decision of May 1, 2003 dismissing the appeal is affirmed.