

identifying data deleted to  
prevent identity uncorroborated  
invasion of personal privacy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
20 Mass. Rm. A3042, 425 I Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20536



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

**PUBLIC COPY**

HA

MAR 29 2014

FILE: Office: SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA Date:

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under sections 212(i) of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, San Francisco, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of the China. She was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having sought to procure admission into the United States by fraud and willful misrepresentation of a material fact. The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative based on her April 30, 1996, marriage to a naturalized U.S. citizen. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) in order to remain in the United States and reside with her U.S. citizen spouse and lawful permanent resident children.

The District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative. The application was denied accordingly. *See District Director Decision* dated June 5, 2002.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

- (1) The Attorney General (now the Secretary of Homeland Security, [Secretary]) may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

After reviewing the amendments to the Act regarding fraud and misrepresentation and after noting the increased impediments Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar, eliminating alien parents of U.S. citizens and resident aliens as applicants and eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

To recapitulate, the record clearly reflects and the applicant stated that she obtained a photo-substituted Panamanian passport and used that passport on May 2, 1991, in an attempt to gain entry into the United States. The applicant was placed in removal proceedings and was ordered removed in absentia by an Immigration Judge on November 25, 1991. The applicant failed to surrender and on August 12, 1999 she appeared before the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now know as Citizen and Immigration Services, (CIS)) requesting information about adjustment of status based on her marriage to a U.S. citizen. On that day the applicant was taken into custody based on the November 1991 removal order. The applicant filed a motion to reopen her case, which was denied by the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA) dismissed a subsequent appeal on October 12, 2001. The applicant filed a motion to remand the case to the BIA before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On May 19, 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the BIA where it is still pending.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See *Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In the present case, the applicant must demonstrate extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse.

*Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the BIA deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

On appeal, counsel states that CIS failed to correctly assess extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse (Mr. Romero-Anaya). Mr. Romero-Anaya presented an affidavit in which he states that he loves the applicant very much and depends on her for emotional, moral, physical and financial support. He further states that they both work as janitors and they are both responsible for their financial obligations.

Furthermore counsel states that CIS ignored that the applicant has significant favorable factors that outweigh her misrepresentation during her attempt to gain entry into the United States.

Before the AAO can look into the favorable and unfavorable factors in this case it must first determine if the qualifying family members would suffer extreme hardship if the applicant's waiver application was not approved.

Counsel further states that the applicant fears for her life if she was to be removed to her home country because her ex-husband was abusive. The applicant submitted an affidavit in which she stated that she will be devastated if she is returned to China as she left in order to find a job to support her family, that it will be extremely difficult to survive, and that she fears for her life because her ex-husband was very abusive.

"Extreme hardship" to an alien herself cannot be considered in determining eligibility for a section 212(i) waiver of inadmissibility. *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968).

The assertion of financial hardship to the applicant's spouse is contradicted by the fact that, pursuant to § 213A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1183a, and the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 213a, the person who files an application for an immigration visa or for adjustment of status on or after December 19, 1997 must execute a Form I-864 (Affidavit of Support) which is legally enforceable on behalf of a beneficiary (the applicant) who is an immediate relative or a family-sponsored immigrant when an applicant applies for an immigrant visa. The

statute and the regulations do not provide for an alien beneficiary to execute an affidavit of support on behalf of a U.S. citizen or resident alien petitioner. Therefore, a claim that an alien beneficiary is needed for the purpose of supporting a citizen or resident alien petitioner can only be considered as a hardship in rare instances.

The BIA noted in *Cervantes-Gonzalez*, that the alien's wife knew that he was in deportation proceedings at the time they were married. The BIA stated that this factor went to the wife's expectations at the time they wed because she was aware she might have to face the decision of parting from the husband or follow him to Mexico in the event he was ordered deported. The BIA found this to undermine the alien's argument that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if he were deported. *Id.*

In the present case, it appears that Mr. Romero-Anaya was aware of the applicant's immigration violation and the possibility of being removed at the time of their marriage on April 30, 1996.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *Hassan v. INS*, *supra*, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. The U.S. Supreme Court additionally held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality reflects that the applicant has failed to show that her U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship if she were removed from the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.