


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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE:



Office: MIAMI, FLORIDA

Date **MAY 17 2004**

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Acting District Director, Miami, Florida, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Cuba who filed this application for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident under section 1 of the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) of November 2, 1966. The CAA provides, in part:

[T]he status of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States subsequent to January 1, 1959 and has been physically present in the United States for at least one year, may be adjusted by the Attorney General, (now the Secretary of Homeland Security, (Secretary)), in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if the alien makes an application for such adjustment, and the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence.

The Acting District Director found the applicant inadmissible to the United States because he falls within the purview of section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Acting District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative. The application was denied accordingly. *See Acting District Director Decision* dated July 30, 2003.

Section 212(a)(2) of the Act states in pertinent part, that:

(A)(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-

- (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

. . . .

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(h) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs (A)(i)(I) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if -

. . . .

- (1) (B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien

The record reflects that the applicant has the following convictions:

December 2, 1982: Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, convicted for the offense of burglary of an Unoccupied Dwelling and Grand Theft 2nd Degree.

September 7, 1990: Circuit Court in and for Monroe, County, Florida for the offense of Grand Theft.

June 16, 1993: Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, for the offense of Resisting Officer with Violence.

The applicant is inadmissible to the United States due to his convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude (grand theft).

Section 212(h) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In the present case, the applicant must demonstrate extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen children.

Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the BIA deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

On appeal counsel asserts that the applicant stated to him that to the best of his knowledge he never submitted an Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) and that is why he did not submit evidence supporting the extreme hardship that his qualifying relatives would suffer if he were not permitted to remain in the United States. On appeal counsel states that the applicant's children would suffer extreme hardship if the applicant were deported to Cuba due to the separation, which would interrupt their stable life and destroy their emotional and psychological stability.

Counsel assertion is not persuasive since a review of the record of proceedings reveals that on June 22, 2001, the applicant submitted a signed Form I-601, along with the appropriate fee, but no documentation regarding the extreme hardship his children would suffer if he were not permitted to remain in the United States. On appeal, no independent corroboration or documentation was submitted to show that the applicant's children would suffer extreme hardship due to the separation from the applicant.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme

hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *Hassan v. INS, supra*, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. The U.S. Supreme Court additionally held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality reflects that the applicant has failed to show that his U.S. citizen children would suffer extreme hardship if he were not allowed to remain in the United States at this time. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.