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Date: **MAY 26 2004**

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
Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under sections 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Interim District Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of the Philippines. She was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured admission into the United States by fraud and willful misrepresentation of a material fact. The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative filed by her naturalized U.S. citizen spouse. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) in order to remain in the United States and reside with her U.S. citizen spouse and child.

The Interim District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative. The application was denied accordingly. *See Interim District Director Decision* dated May 19, 2003.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

- (1) The Attorney General (now the Secretary of Homeland Security, [Secretary]) may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

After reviewing the amendments to the Act regarding fraud and misrepresentation and after noting the increased impediments Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar, eliminating alien parents of U.S. citizens and resident aliens as applicants and eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

To recapitulate, the record clearly reflects that the applicant obtained a Philippine passport that did not belong to her and on June 13, 1991, she presented that passport at the Los Angeles, CA International Airport where she was admitted as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure. The applicant remained in the United States beyond her authorized stay and married a now naturalized U.S. citizen on February 22, 1992.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the

determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In the present case, the applicant must demonstrate extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse.

*Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the BIA deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

On appeal, counsel states that Citizen and Immigration Services, (CIS) failed to correctly assess the extreme hardship the applicant's spouse would suffer if the applicant's waiver application is denied and she is forced to depart the country. Counsel submits a brief, an affidavit from the applicant's spouse (Mr. Juco) and medical records for Mr. Juco. In his affidavit Mr. Juco states that the applicant is a wonderful mother, a great source of love and support for both himself and their U.S. citizen daughter. In the brief and in Mr. Juco's affidavit it is stated that Mr. Juco suffers from severe rashes, high cholesterol and eye cataracts and that in 2003 he underwent surgery for a brain hemorrhage as a result of a stroke. Additionally, Mr. Juco underwent cataract surgery in 1999 for his right eye. No documentary evidence was provided to substantiate that Mr. Juco did not recover from his surgeries or that he cannot take care of himself and his daily chores. Mr. Juco receives medication for his cholesterol and his rashes and there is no independent corroboration to show that his medical condition will be jeopardized if he decides to relocate to the Philippines with the applicant.

Mr. Juco states that if the applicant is forced to leave the United States he will be forced to make a decision of either relocating to the Philippines with the applicant or staying in the United States to live with his children. Mr. Juco states that he will suffer extreme hardship due to the unstable political, social and economic conditions in the Philippines and having to separate from his extended family who live in the United States. Mr. Juco further states that he would lose his job and his medical insurance that is provided by his employer.

There are no laws that require Mr. Juco to leave the United States and live abroad. In *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F. 2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States." The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. *See Shoostary v. INS*, 39 F. 3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).

On appeal counsel states that insufficient medical facilities for the applicant's child would impose hardship to the child and to Mr. Juco. Mr. Juco worries that his daughter's condition has worsened as a direct result of her concern for her mother. Mr. Juco's daughter suffers from rashes but no evidence was provided to indicate that adequate health maintenance and follow-up care and medication are unavailable in the Philippines. Extreme hardship has not been shown to the applicant's spouse based on her child's medical condition.

As mentioned, section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the qualifying family member, citizen or lawfully resident *spouse or parent* of such alien. Congress specifically did not mention extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen or resident child. The assertions regarding the hardship the applicant's child would suffer will thus not be considered.

In the brief counsel asserts that the acting district director used the guidelines to determine extreme hardship from cases in connection with suspension of deportation and waivers under section 212(h) of the Act, arising from criminal violations. Counsel states that the extreme hardship analysis from these cases cannot be transferred to cases involving section 212(i) waivers.

The BIA stated in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* that:

Although it is, for the most part, prudent to avoid cross application between different types of relief of particular principles or standards, we find the factors articulated in cases involving suspension of deportation and other waivers of inadmissibility to be helpful, given that both forms of relief require extreme hardship and the exercise of discretion.

The AAO therefore, finds counsel's argument on that point unpersuasive.

The BIA further noted in *Cervantes-Gonzalez*, that the alien's wife knew that he was in deportation proceedings at the time they were married. The BIA stated that this factor went to the wife's expectations at the time they wed because she was aware she might have to face the decision of parting from the husband or follow him to Mexico in the event he was ordered deported. The BIA found this to undermine the alien's argument that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if he were deported. *Id.* In the present case, it appears that Mr. Juco was aware of the applicant's immigration violation and the possibility of being removed at the time of their marriage on February 22, 1992.

Counsel also states that CIS did not balance the favorable factors against adverse factors required to decide whether a waiver is merited in the Secretary's discretion. Before the AAO can look into the favorable and unfavorable factors in this case it must first determine if the qualifying family member would suffer extreme hardship if the applicant's waiver application was not approved.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *Hassan v. INS*, *supra*, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. The U.S. Supreme Court additionally held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

The issues in this matter were thoroughly discussed by the acting district director in his present decision. A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality reflects that the applicant has failed to show that her U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship if she were removed from the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.