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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
20 Mass. Rm. A3042  
Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services



FILE:



Office: PANAMA

Date:

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IN RE:



APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert P. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Panama. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Colombia. The applicant was found inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA, the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). The record reflects that the applicant is the spouse of a U.S. citizen. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to immigrate to the United States.

The OIC found that the applicant had failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse and denied the application accordingly. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act provides:

In general.—Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). The OIC based the finding of inadmissibility under this section on records of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which show that the applicant presented a counterfeit nonimmigrant visa in order to procure admission into the United States on September 21, 1995. *Decision of the District Director* (August 13, 2003) at 2. The AAO notes that the decision of the OIC incorrectly stated that the counterfeit visa was affixed in a Brazilian passport. Records of the former INS show that the passport she presented was, in fact, Colombian. The identifying number of the passport in former INS records also matches that shown on the copy of the applicant's Colombian passport, submitted in connection with this appeal.

The applicant states on appeal, "I am clarifying that I never had a valid Brazilian passport. Please check this matter because it is very important to establish that I was not aware that I was traveling with fraudulent documents on September 20, 1995." Form I-290B, *Notice of Appeal to the Administrative Appeals Unit* filed September 9, 2003). As stated above, the statement of the OIC that the applicant presented a Brazilian passport was in error. The record continues to accurately reflect that the applicant presented a counterfeit nonimmigrant visa.

The AAO notes that, in these proceedings, "the burden of proof shall be upon [the applicant] to establish that he is not inadmissible under any provision of [the] Act . . ." INA § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The applicant provided no explanation or evidence concerning how she came to present a counterfeit nonimmigrant visa upon her attempted entry into the United States if she did not intend to make a material misrepresentation in order to procure admission. The OIC's inadmissibility determination is therefore affirmed. The question remains whether she is eligible for a waiver.

Section 212(i) provides, in pertinent part:

(i) (1) The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully permanent resident spouse or parent of such an alien . . .”

8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1). Hardship to the alien herself is not a permissible consideration under the statute. A section 212(i) waiver is therefore dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant.

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative “is not . . . fixed and inflexible,” and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566. The BIA has held:

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.

*Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted). Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See *Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In support of her appeal, the applicant submits her own statement and a statement from her husband emphasizing the emotional hardship of separation. No evidence of hardship was submitted to the OIC, below.

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant’s spouse faces extreme hardship if the applicant is refused admission. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996); *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship). “[O]nly in cases of great actual or prospective

injury . . . will the bar be removed.” *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246 (BIA 1984). Further, demonstrated financial difficulties alone are generally insufficient to establish extreme hardship. *See INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (upholding BIA finding that economic detriment alone is insufficient to establish extreme hardship). The AAO therefore finds that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse as required under INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1186(i).

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. INA § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.