



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

[REDACTED]

FILE: [REDACTED] Office: LOS ANGELES DISTRICT OFFICE Date: **OCT 26 2004**

IN RE: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

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prevent unauthorized
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DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of the Philippines. The applicant was found inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA, the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). The record reflects that the applicant is the spouse of a U.S. citizen. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to remain in the United States with her husband.

The district director found that the applicant had failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse. The application was denied accordingly.

On appeal, counsel contends that the applicant has established extreme hardship to her spouse. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act provides:

In general.—Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). The district director based the finding of inadmissibility under this section on the applicant's admitted use of an assumed name to fraudulently procure admission into the United States. *Decision of the District Director* (September 17, 2003) at 2. The district director's determination of inadmissibility is not contested by the applicant on appeal. Section 212(i) provides, in pertinent part:

(i) (1) The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully permanent resident spouse or parent of such an alien . . ."

8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1). Hardship to the alien herself is not a permissible consideration under the statute. A section 212(i) waiver is therefore dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant.

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative "is not . . . fixed and inflexible," and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to U.S. citizens or lawful

permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566. The BIA has held:

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996). (Citations omitted).

Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In addition, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held, “the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States,” and, “[w]hen the BIA fails to give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion.” *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). *See also Cerrillo-Perez v. INS*, 809 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)) (“We have stated in a series of cases that the hardship to the alien resulting from his separation from family members may, in itself, constitute extreme hardship.”) (citations omitted). The AAO notes that the present case arises within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Separation of family will therefore be given the appropriate weight under Ninth Circuit law in the assessment of hardship factors in the present case.

In support of the appeal, counsel submits a brief analyzing the evidence presented below in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors. Specifically, counsel states that the applicant’s U.S. citizen spouse has family ties including his mother, father, and eight siblings in the United States. Statements of counsel do not constitute evidence. *See Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Review of the record shows that the applicant made a similar statement in his affidavit below. *Affidavit of Carlos Martinez* (June 21, 2000), at 2. There is no corroborative evidence of this statement in the record. Prior immigration forms indicate that [REDACTED] father resides in the Philippines. *See Form G-325, Biographic Information* (complete September 19, 1997). A search of USCIS automated records based on the name and date of birth given for his father failed to retrieve a record of his admission as a lawful permanent resident. The AAO notes that, in proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. INA § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The presence of U.S. citizen and lawful permanent resident family ties of the qualifying relative is relevant to the determination of the hardship the qualifying relative would face, and is a factor upon which the applicant has placed significant reliance in his claim of eligibility for a waiver. In view of the inconsistency in the record, and the ready availability of supporting documentation (or at least alien numbers for USCIS verification), the AAO finds that the applicant has failed meet his evidentiary burden with respect to his U.S. family ties.

In support of the claim of hardship if the applicant relocates with the applicant to avoid separation, counsel asserts that the applicant's spouse would have difficulty readjusting to his country of birth, the Philippines, where he has not lived for the last 15 or so years. Counsel stresses the lack of family ties in the Philippines, the poor economy (including high unemployment), political instability, and the humid climate. Counsel also asserts that the lack of health insurance associated with the likely unemployment would also contribute to the hardship faced by the applicant's spouse. The AAO notes that the applicant has submitted no objective evidence of country conditions in the record. There is no indication that any member of the applicant's family suffers from a significant health condition.

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant's husband faces extreme hardship if he remains in the United States and the applicant is refused admission. Rather, the record demonstrates that he will face no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States. Congress provided for a waiver of inadmissibility, but under limited circumstances. In limiting the availability of the waiver to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996); *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship). "[O]nly in cases of great actual or prospective injury . . . will the bar be removed." *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246 (BIA 1984). Further, demonstrated financial difficulties alone are generally insufficient to establish extreme hardship. *See INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (upholding BIA finding that economic detriment alone is insufficient to establish extreme hardship).

While the Ninth Circuit places particular emphasis on consideration of the impact of separation of the family, the waiver is nevertheless not to be granted in every case where possible separation is at issue. The record does not contain evidence that the applicant's spouse would face a particular or uncommon hardship if he were separated from his siblings and parents. Further, as noted above, the applicant has failed to meet her evidentiary burden with respect to establishing that her husband's immediate family members are lawful permanent residents or U.S. citizens, as required by statute. It therefore appears that the applicant's spouse faces, as all spouses facing deportation or refusal of admission of a spouse, the difficult decision of whether to remain in the United States or relocate to avoid separation. The BIA has held, "[t]he mere election by the spouse to remain in the United States, absent [a determination of exceptional hardship] is not a governing factor since any inconvenience or hardship which might thereby occur would be self-imposed." *See Matter of Mansour*, 11 I&N Dec. 306, 307 (BIA 1965); *see also Shooshtary v. INS*, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating, "[t]he uprooting of family, the separation from friends, and other normal processes of readjustment to one's home country after having spent a number of years in the United States are not considered extreme, but represent the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens in the respondent's circumstances.") In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardship faced by the qualifying relative rises to the level of extreme. As stated by the Ninth Circuit, "[i]n sum, this case is devoid of those unique extenuating circumstances necessary to demonstrate 'extreme

hardship' consistent with the 'exceptional nature of the . . . remedy.'" *Ramirez-Durazo v. INS*, 794 F.2d 491, 499 (9th Cir. 1986).

The AAO therefore finds that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse as required under INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1186(i).

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. INA § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.