

identifying data destined to  
prevent clearly warranted  
invasion of personal privacy


U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
20 Mass. Rm. A3042  
Washington, DC 20529

PUBLIC COPY



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

HA



FILE: [Redacted]

Office: SAN FRANCISCO DISTRICT OFFICE

Date: [Redacted]

IN RE: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, San Francisco. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of the Philippines. The applicant was found inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA, the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for “having misrepresented her purpose upon entry into the United States.” *Decision of the District Director* (April 19, 2002), at 2. The record reflects that the applicant is the spouse of a U.S. Citizen and the daughter of a lawful permanent resident mother and father.

The district director found that the applicant had failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse or lawful permanent resident parents. The application was denied accordingly.

On appeal, counsel contends that the applicant has established extreme hardship to her spouse. In support of the appeal, counsel submits documentation that the applicant and her husband are undergoing treatment for infertility. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act provides:

In general.—Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). The district director based the finding of inadmissibility under this section on the applicant’s fraudulent misrepresentation in order to gain admission to the United States. *Decision of the District Director* (April 19, 2002) at 2. The district director’s determination of inadmissibility is not contested on appeal. Section 212(i) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) (1) The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully permanent resident spouse or parent of such an alien . . .”

8 U.S.C. § 212(i). Hardship to the alien herself is not a permissible consideration under the statute. A section 212(i) waiver is therefore dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant.

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative “is not . . . fixed and inflexible,” and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an

alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566. The BIA has held:

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996). (Citations omitted).

Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant's husband or parents face extreme hardship if the applicant is refused admission. There is no evidence of record addressing the hardship to the applicant's parents. The only evidence submitted regarding hardship to the applicant's husband is the handwritten statement he filed with the application for waiver before the district, and a very short statement from a doctor that, [REDACTED] and her husband, Jezer Bombita, are under my treatment for infertility. Please allow her to remain in the US [sic] for this purpose." *Letter of Carla Fracchia, MD, MPH* (May 16, 2002). In his statement, the applicant's husband makes reference to the effects of the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines, and fear that he has "from the 'THREATS' [sic] due to the death of her uncle." *Statement of Jezer Bombita*, at 2 (undated). There is no country conditions documentation to support Mr. Bombita's contention regarding the inability to relocate to the Philippines due to the aftermath of Mount Pinatubo's eruption in 1991. There is also no further detail or explanation regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of the applicant's uncle or any related threats. Therefore, the AAO cannot make a finding of extreme hardship due to these factors, based on the information in the record.

As noted by the district director below, the record demonstrates that the applicant's husband will face no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States. Congress provided for a waiver of inadmissibility, but under limited circumstances. In limiting the availability of the waiver to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists. The emotional effects that undoubtedly result from the refusal of the applicant's admission in this case appear no greater than that which would be suffered by other families facing the same situation, and do not rise to the level of "extreme." The doctor's letter alone is insufficient to raise the level of hardship to "extreme," as contemplated by the statute and case law. The record lacks evidence that the applicant or her husband have a serious medical condition for which treatment may be unavailable in the Philippines, resulting in extreme hardship to the applicant's husband if her admission is refused.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal, such as emotional distress due to separation from one's spouse, are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996); *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship). "[O]nly in cases of great actual or prospective injury . . . will the bar be removed." *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246 (BIA 1984). Absent a finding of extreme hardship due to relocation with the applicant, the BIA has held, "[t]he mere election by the spouse to remain in the United States . . . is not a governing factor since any inconvenience or hardship which might thereby occur would be self-imposed." *See Matter of Mansour*, 11 I&N Dec. 306, 307 (BIA 1965). Further, financial difficulties alone are generally insufficient to establish extreme hardship. *See INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (upholding BIA finding that economic detriment alone is insufficient to establish extreme hardship).

The AAO therefore finds that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse or parents as required under INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1186(i).

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. INA § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.