

Identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042
Washington, DC 20529

PUBLIC COPY



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

H2

[REDACTED]

FILE: [REDACTED]

Office: MIAMI, FLORIDA

Date: JAN 24 2005

IN RE: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under § 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Robert P. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Miami, Florida. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Chile who entered the United States and was admitted as a visitor in 1992. There is no evidence that the applicant extended his authorized period of stay or otherwise obtained permission to remain in the United States. The applicant was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The record indicates that the applicant is married to a U.S. citizen and that he is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to remain with his wife in the United States.

The district director found that based on the evidence in the record, the applicant had failed to establish extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse and children. The application was denied accordingly. On appeal, counsel asserts that separation from family alone may be the most important single hardship factor. Counsel offers no new evidence on appeal.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part, that:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

Section 212(h) states in pertinent part that:

(h) The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs (A)(i)(I) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if-

(1)(A) [I]t is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that-

(i) [T]he activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,

(ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and

(iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien.

The applicant was convicted of aggravated assault and battery in 1996, which was less than 15 years prior to the adjudication of his application for adjustment of status. The applicant is therefore statutorily ineligible for a waiver pursuant to § 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act. He is however, eligible to apply for a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to § 212(h)(B) of the Act.

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship. These factors included the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

U.S. court decisions have additionally held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *Hassan v. INS, supra*, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court additionally held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

Counsel's assertion that separation from family in and of itself establishes extreme hardship is unconvincing. Counsel suggests that CIS takes the hardship suffered upon family separation lightly, because CIS failed to find that the instant record establishes extreme hardship. This is not the case, however. It is assumed that all family separations caused by removal of a family member will cause emotional hardship, at the very least. This is not taken lightly. A review of the documentation in the record at hand, when considered in its totality reflects that the applicant has failed to show that his U.S. citizen spouse would suffer hardship unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon removal. This is the key consideration in determining if a given condition is extreme or not.

Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion. In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.