U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Rm. 3000
Washington, DC 20529

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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

PUBLIC COPY

Hr

[redacted]

FILE: [redacted] Office: LOS ANGELES, CA Date: SEP 2 0 2007

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Ellen L. Johnson

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of the Philippines who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured entry into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation; the record indicates that the applicant entered the United States on October 9, 1998 using a passport and visa containing an assumed name. The applicant is married to a U.S. citizen and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director,* dated November 1, 2005.

On appeal, counsel contends that Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) failed to properly consider and analyze the extreme hardship factors set forth in the applicant's case, as required by legal precedent decisions. In support of the waiver request, counsel submits a brief, dated December 23, 2005. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

> (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Based on the evidence in the record, the applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

> (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General (Secretary), waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General (Secretary) that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien...

A waiver of the bar to admission under section 212(i) of the Act resulting from a violation of section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Extreme hardship to the applicant herself is not

a permissible consideration under the statute. In the present case, the applicant's spouse, married to the applicant since February 2001, is the only qualifying relative, and any hardship to the applicant cannot be considered, except as it may affect the applicant's spouse. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez,* 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative "is not . . . fixed and inflexible," and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez,* 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez,* the Board of Immigration Appeals set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566. The BIA held in *Matter of O-J-O-,* 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted) that:

> Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.

This matter arises in the Los Angeles district office, which is within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. That court has stated, "the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States," and also, "[w]hen the BIA fails to give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion." *Salcido-Salcido v. INS,* 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). *See also Cerrillo-Perez v. INS,* 809 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)) ("We have stated in a series of cases that the hardship to the alien resulting from his separation from family members may, in itself, constitute extreme hardship.") (citations omitted). Separation of family will therefore be given the appropriate weight under Ninth Circuit law in the assessment of hardship factors in the present case.

To begin, the applicant's spouse states that the applicant's spouse would experience emotional hardship were the applicant removed from the United States. As stated by the applicant's spouse, "...if my wife's [the applicant's] request for an Adjustment of Status is denied, she will be forced to depart the United States and I will be left here alone. This would not only be extremely painful emotionally but my mental and physical health would suffer...if my wife and I were separated it would cause a great deal of emotional and mental distress because of my personal and religious commitment to our wedding vows..." *Declaration of Hardship from* [redacted] dated August 14, 2002.

There is no documentation establishing that the applicant's spouse's emotional or psychological hardship is any different from other families separated as a result of immigration violations. Moreover, no objective evidence is provided to corroborate the applicant's spouse's statements regarding his mental state, such as statements from a professional in the medical field documenting that the applicant's spouse is suffering or has the propensity to suffer from a medical condition due to the applicant's immigration situation. Finally, it has not been established that it would be an extreme hardship for the applicant's spouse to visit the applicant, whether in the Philippines or in any other country to which the applicant relocates, on a regular basis.

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse will endure hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. However, his situation if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of deportation or exclusion and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS,* 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, *Matter of Pilch,* 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS,* 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *Hassan v. INS, supra,* held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported.

Moreover, the applicant's spouse states that he will suffer financial hardship if the applicant were removed from the United States. As stated by the applicant's spouse "...we have started the process of expanding our home and this requires our combined income...if my wife's request for Adjustment of Status is denied...it would...be financial hardship..." *Id. at 2.* According to the Form I-864 completed by the applicant's spouse in May 2002, the minimum income requirement from the 2002 poverty guidelines chart for a family of two was $14,925. At the time the form was completed, the applicant's spouse declared an annual salary of $65,000 per year as an engineer, four times the poverty guidelines. As such, it has not been established that the applicant would not be able to assume the financial responsibilities of the household based on his individual income. Moreover, counsel provides no evidence to substantiate that the applicant's spouse, a payroll analyst, would not be able to assume a similar position, relatively comparable in pay and responsibilities were she to relocate to the Philippines, or any other country of her choosing, thereby assisting the applicant's spouse with the household expenses. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici,* 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California,* 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

Courts considering the impact of financial detriment on a finding of extreme hardship have repeatedly held that, while it must be considered in the overall determination, "[e]conomic disadvantage alone does not constitute "extreme hardship." *Ramirez-Durazo v. INS,* 794 F.2d 491, 497 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that "lower standard of living in Mexico and the difficulties of readjustment to that culture and environment . . . simply are not sufficient."); *Shooshtary v. INS,* 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating, "the extreme hardship requirement . . . was not enacted to insure that the family members of excludable aliens fulfill their dreams or

continue in the lives which they currently enjoy. The uprooting of family, the separation from friends, and other normal processes of readjustment to one's home country after having spent a number of years in the United States are not considered extreme, but represent the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens in the respondent's circumstances."); *Matter of Shaughnessy,* 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship); *INS v. Jong Ha Wang,* 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (upholding BIA finding that economic detriment alone is insufficient to establish extreme hardship).

The AAO notes that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must be established in the event that he or she accompanies the applicant or in the event that he or she remains in the United States, as a qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request. In this case, the applicant has not asserted any reasons why the applicant's spouse is unable to relocate to the Philippines, or any other country of their choosing, to accompany the applicant were she removed.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality reflects that the applicant has failed to show that her U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship if she were removed from the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.