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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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[REDACTED]

FILE: [REDACTED] Office: CHICAGO DISTRICT OFFICE Date: JUN 03 2008
(relates)

IN RE: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Chicago, Illinois, and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The waiver application will be denied.

The applicant, a citizen of Mexico, was found inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for seeking to procure a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under the Act by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant is the spouse of a United States citizen and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to remain in the United States with his wife.

The District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on his wife, the qualifying relative, and denied the Form I-601, Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility.

On appeal, counsel contends that the applicant's wife would suffer extreme hardship if the applicant is required to return to Mexico. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

The record establishes that the applicant entered the United States, fraudulently, by presenting a Mexican passport with a fraudulent I-551 stamp. Thus, the applicant entered the United States by making a willful misrepresentation of material facts (his identity and residence status) in order to procure entry into the United States. Accordingly, the applicant was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). The applicant does not dispute his inadmissibility; rather, he is filing for a waiver of his inadmissibility.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act states, in pertinent part, the following:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A section 212(i) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from a violation of section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship the applicant or his daughter would experience upon denial of the application is irrelevant to section 212(i) waiver proceedings; the only relevant hardship in the present case is that suffered by the applicant's wife. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

The applicant is required to demonstrate that his wife would face extreme hardship in the event the waiver application is denied, regardless of whether she joins her in Mexico or remains in Illinois without him.

Court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, in *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), the BIA held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. The United States Supreme Court additionally held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative "is not . . . fixed and inflexible," and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to United States citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566. In *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted), the BIA held that:

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.

Counsel submitted the Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal, on August 10, 2005. Counsel marked the box at section two of the Form I-290B to indicate that a brief and/or evidence would be sent within sixty days.

However, the AAO did not receive this additional brief and/or evidence. As such, the AAO faxed a follow-up letter to counsel on February 29, 2008, requesting that the brief and/or additional evidence be sent within five business days. Counsel did not respond to the AAO's fax. Thus, the AAO deems the record complete and ready for adjudication.

The record establishes that the applicant's wife is a twenty-nine-year-old citizen of the United States. She and the applicant have been married since September 8, 1997. They have a U.S. citizen daughter who is now nine years old. A son died at birth.

In her April 9, 2002 letter, the applicant's wife states that losing her son brought her to the point of near-insanity, that she was severely depressed and did not want to live, but that the applicant comforted her and gave her the strength to continue; that the applicant supports her financially; that she had to stop working when she was pregnant with her daughter, as she was confined to bed rest for nine months; that, without the applicant, she would be forced into poverty; that she would not have health insurance without the applicant; that she would like to further her education and pursue a career, but doing so would be impossible if the applicant were not in the United States; that the couple's daughter loves the applicant very much; and that the applicant's absence from the United States would result in a great deal of grief for the family.

The record also contains several letters attesting to the applicant's good moral character.

Courts considering the impact of financial detriment on a finding of extreme hardship have repeatedly held that, while it must be considered in the overall determination, "[e]conomic disadvantage alone does not constitute "extreme hardship." *Ramirez-Durazo v. INS*, 794 F.2d 491, 497 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that "lower standard of living in Mexico and the difficulties of readjustment to that culture and environment . . . simply are not sufficient."); *Shooshtary v. INS*, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating, "the extreme hardship requirement . . . was not enacted to insure that the family members of excludable aliens fulfill their dreams or continue in the lives which they currently enjoy. The uprooting of family, the separation from friends, and other normal processes of readjustment to one's home country after having spent a number of years in the United States are not considered extreme, but represent the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens in the respondent's circumstances."); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship); *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (upholding BIA finding that economic detriment alone is insufficient to establish extreme hardship).

As noted previously, the applicant is required to demonstrate that his wife would face extreme hardship in the event the waiver application is denied, regardless of whether she joins him in Mexico or remains in Illinois without him. In limiting the availability of the waiver to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress provided that a waiver is not available in every case where a qualifying family relationship exists.

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant's wife will face extreme hardship if the applicant returns to Mexico without her. The record does not establish that she faces greater hardships than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States. The evidence of record does not establish that she would experience financial, medical, or emotional hardship that would rise to the level of "extreme" as contemplated by statute and case law: the financial and emotional hardships set forth in her April 9, 2002 letter are faced by most people in her situation; she has failed to establish that she would suffer greater hardship than others in her situation.

Nor has the applicant established that his wife would face extreme hardship if she joins him in Mexico: no evidence was submitted or claims made to demonstrate that she would face hardship beyond that normally faced by others in her situation. Diminished standards of living, separation from family, and cultural adjustment are to be expected in such a situation.

In nearly every qualifying relationship, there is a deep level of affection and a certain amount of emotional and social interdependence. While the prospect of separation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families, in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship, and thus the familial and emotional bonds, exist. The point made in this and prior decisions on this matter is that the current state of the law, viewed from a legislative, administrative, or judicial point of view, requires that the hardship, which meets the standard in INA § 212(i), be above and beyond the normal, expected hardship involved in such cases. In adjudicating this appeal, the AAO finds that the record fails to demonstrate that the applicant's wife would suffer hardship beyond that normally expected upon the removal of a spouse.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that his United States citizen wife would suffer hardship that is unusual or beyond that normally expected upon the inadmissibility of a spouse. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i), the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The applicant has sustained not that burden. Accordingly, the AAO will not disturb the director's denial of the waiver application.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.