

AD

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

PUBLIC COPY

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE
425 Eye Street N.W.
BCIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F
Washington, D.C. 20536

[Redacted]

FILE: [Redacted]

Office: San Francisco

Date:

APR 21 2003

IN RE: Applicant:

[Redacted]

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under
Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

**Identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy**

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Bureau) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Robert P. Wieman, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, San Francisco, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of the Philippines who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation on May 2, 1999. The applicant married a U.S. citizen on January 18, 2001, in the United States, and she is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative. The applicant seeks the above waiver under section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel states that he is gathering medical records, bills and other documentation to show that it is medically and psychologically necessary for the applicant to be with her husband. Counsel requests an additional 60 days in which to submit the documentation. More than 60 days have elapsed since the appeal was filed on August 27, 2002, and no additional documentation has been received. Therefore, a decision will be entered based on the present record.

The record reflects that the applicant used a fraudulent passport in another person's name to procure admission into the United States on May 2, 1999.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in part, that:

(i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

(1) The Attorney General, may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) violation due to passage of time. Nothing could be clearer than Congress' desire in recent years to limit, rather than extend, the relief available to aliens who have committed fraud or misrepresentation. These amendments are applicable to pending cases. See *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999). Congress has almost unfettered power to decide which aliens may come to and remain in this country. This power has been recognized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See *Fiallo v. Bell*, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); *Kleindienst v. Mandel*, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). See also *Matter of Yeung*, 21 I&N Dec. 610, 612 (BIA 1997).

Congress has increased the penalties on fraud and willful misrepresentation, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar and eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship. Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

To recapitulate, the applicant knowingly obtained a Philippine passport in an assumed name and used that document to gain admission into the United States by fraud in 1999, a felony.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for section 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. See *Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board) stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

The Board noted in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* that the alien's wife knew that he was in deportation proceedings at the time they were married. The Board stated that this factor goes to the wife's expectations at the time they were wed. The alien's wife was aware that she may have to face the decision of parting from her husband or following him to Mexico in the event he was ordered deported. The alien's wife was also aware that a move to Mexico would separate her from her family in the United States. The Board found this to undermine the alien's argument that his wife will suffer extreme hardship if he is deported. The Board then refers to *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), where the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.

The applicant in the present matter procured admission into the United States by fraud in 1999 and it must be presumed that her husband was aware of this when they married in 2001.

The Board in *Cervantes-Gonzalez*, *supra*, also referred to *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 983 (1971), where the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

It is noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in *Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I & N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998), need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. The applicant in the present matter entered the United States in 1999 by fraud and married her spouse in 2001. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. However, as previously noted, a consideration of the Attorney General's discretion is applicable only after extreme hardship has been established.

There are no laws that require a United States citizen to leave the United States and live abroad. Further, the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that the qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in the removal of a family member. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.