



U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

FILE [REDACTED]

Office: Miami

Date:

FEB 28 2003

IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under
Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(i)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



PUBLIC COPY

INSTRUCTIONS:


This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS


Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Acting District Director, Miami, Florida, and a subsequent appeal was rejected by the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The matter is before the Associate Commissioner on a motion to reconsider. The motion will be granted. The order rejecting the appeal will be withdrawn, and the appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Haiti who attempted to procure admission into the United States on July 8, 1995, by presenting a photo-switched Bahamian passport. On August 8, 1996, he was ordered excluded and deported *in absentia* by an immigration judge after the judge found the applicant to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for having attempted to procure admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation and for being an immigrant without a valid visa or lieu document. The applicant failed to file an appeal within 30 days of that decision and the decision became final. The applicant failed to depart.

The applicant married a U.S. citizen in March 1997 and that marriage ended on April 23, 1998. The applicant married a native of Haiti on April 14, 2001, who is a lawful permanent resident. The applicant seeks the above waiver under section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to adjust his status under the Haitian Refugee Immigrant Fairness Act of 1998 (HRIFA).

The acting district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. The Associate Commissioner rejected the appeal and withdrew the acting district director's decision upon concluding that the applicant required permission to reapply for admission and such application on Form I-212 should be adjudicated first.

On motion, the acting district director indicates that 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 states, in part, that:

(a) any alien who has been deported or removed from the United States is inadmissible to the United States...

The acting district director asserts that there is no evidence that the applicant departed the United States at any time since his parole on July 8, 1995. As no evidence exists that the applicant actually departed while under an order of deportation, the acting district director requests the Associate Commissioner to reconsider the decision of July 18, 2001.

The applicant filed an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status in September 1999. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 212.2(e), an applicant for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act and part 245 of this chapter must request permission to reapply for entry in conjunction with his or her application for adjustment of

status. This request is made by filing an application for permission to reapply on Form I-212...

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(i)(2), if the alien filed Form I-212 in conjunction with an application for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act, the approval of Form I-212 shall be retroactive to the date on which the alien embarked or reembarked at a place outside the United States.

The amended section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act provides that aliens who have been otherwise ordered removed, ordered deported under section 242 or 217 of the Act or ordered excluded under section 236 of the Act and who have actually been removed (or departed after such an order) are inadmissible for 10 years.

The above regulations have not been updated following the IIRIRA amendments and a Service memorandum dated March 31, 1997, states that section 212(a)(9) does not apply to aliens seeking adjustment of status in the United States who have not previously departed the United States. Therefore, upon reconsideration, it is concluded that the applicant is not required to seek permission to reapply for admission. Therefore, the Form I- 601 application will now be considered.

On appeal, counsel states that the Service failed to grant relief despite the fact that the applicant is married to someone with whom he has had a long-term relationship. Counsel states that this is an abuse of discretion.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in part, that:

(i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

(1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) violation due to passage of time. Nothing could be clearer than Congress' desire in recent years to limit, rather than extend, the relief available to aliens who have committed fraud or misrepresentation. These amendments are applicable to pending cases. See *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999). Congress has almost unfettered power to decide which aliens may come to and remain in this country. This power has been recognized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See *Fiallo v. Bell*, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); *Kleindienst v. Mandel*, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). See also *Matter of Yeung*, 21 I&N Dec. 610, 612 (BIA 1997).

In 1986, Congress expanded the reach of the grounds of inadmissibility in the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, P.L. No. 99-639, and redesignated as section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act by the Immigration Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-649, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 5067). In the Act of 1990, which became effective on June 1, 1991, Congress imposed a statutory bar on those who made oral or written misrepresentations in seeking admission into the United States and on those who made material misrepresentations in seeking admission into the United States or in seeking "other benefits" provided under the Act. Congress made the amended statute applicable to the receipt of visas to, and admission of, aliens who committed acts of fraud or misrepresentation, whether those acts occurred before, on, or after the date of enactment.

In 1990, section 274C of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c, was inserted by the Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 5059), effective for persons or entities that have committed violations on or after November 29, 1990. Section 274C(a) provided penalties for document fraud stating that "it is unlawful for any person or entity knowingly "(2) to use, attempt to use, possess, obtain, accept, or receive or to provide any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document in order to satisfy any requirement of this Act,..."

In 1994 Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (P.L. 103-322, September 13, 1994), which enhanced the criminal penalties of certain offenses, including 18 U.S.C. 1546:

(a)...Impersonation in entry document or admission application; evading or trying to evade immigration laws using assumed or fictitious name...knowingly making false statement under oath about material fact in immigration application or document....

(b) Knowingly using false or unlawfully issued document or false attestation to satisfy the Act provision on verifying whether employee is authorized to work.

The penalty for a violation under (a) increased from up to 5 years imprisonment and a fine or both to up to 10 years imprisonment and a fine or both. The penalty for a violation under (b) increased from up to 2 years imprisonment or a fine, or both, to up to 5 years imprisonment or a fine, or both.

To recapitulate, the applicant knowingly obtained a photo-switched Bahamian passport in an assumed name and used that document to attempt to gain admission into the United States by fraud in July 1995, a felony.

Congress has increased the penalties on fraud and willful misrepresentation, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar and eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship. Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for section 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. See *Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board) stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

The Board noted in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* that the alien's wife knew that he was in deportation proceedings at the time they were married. The Board stated that this factor goes to the wife's expectations at the time they were wed. The alien's wife was aware that she may have to face the decision of parting from her husband or following him to Mexico in the event he was ordered deported. The alien's wife was also aware that a move to Mexico would separate her from her family in the United States. The Board found

this to undermine the alien's argument that his wife will suffer extreme hardship if he is deported. The Board then refers to *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), where the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.

The applicant in the present matter had been unlawfully present in the United States since August 1996 when he was ordered excluded and deported and failed to depart. It must be presumed that his second wife shared that knowledge when they married in April 2001.

The Board in *Cervantes-Gonzalez, supra*, also referred to *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 983 (1971), where the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

The court held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

There are no laws that require a United States citizen to leave the United States and live abroad. Further, the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that the qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in the removal of a family member. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. The motion will be granted, and the order rejecting the appeal will be withdrawn. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The motion is granted. The order of July 18, 2002, rejecting the appeal is withdrawn, and the appeal is dismissed.