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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

**PUBLIC COPY**

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE  
425 Eye Street N.W.  
BCIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F  
Washington, D.C. 20536

[REDACTED]

FILE: [REDACTED]

Office: San Francisco

Date:

MAY 01 2003

IN RE: Applicant:

[REDACTED]

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under  
Section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8  
U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

**Identifying data deleted to  
prevent clearly unwarranted  
invasion of personal privacy**


INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Bureau) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.



Robert P. Wieman, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, San Francisco, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Peru who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant last entered the United States in December 1988 after having been admitted as a nonimmigrant visitor. The applicant remained longer than authorized without applying for or obtaining an extension of temporary stay. She married a native of Peru and naturalized U.S. citizen on May 8, 1999 and is the beneficiary of a Petition for Alien Relative. The applicant seeks a waiver of this permanent bar to admission as provided under section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed upon her qualifying relatives and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant provided sufficient evidence to establish that her U.S. citizen spouse and child would suffer extreme hardship in the event she is removed to Peru. Counsel indicates that the applicant has produced positive evidence that, in total, outweighs the adverse factors.

Section 212(a)(2) of the Act states in pertinent part, that:

(A)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime,...is inadmissible.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in part, that:-The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I),...or subsection (a)(2) and subparagraph (A)(i)(II) of such subsection insofar as it relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana if-

(1)(A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that-

(i)...the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,  
(ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and

(iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien;...and

(2) the Attorney General, in his discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or for adjustment of status....

The record reflects the following:

(1) On June 10, 1992, the applicant was convicted of Petty Theft and was sentenced to 2 days in jail and 18 months probation.

(2) On October 12, 1995, the applicant was convicted of Petty Theft and was sentenced to 4 days in jail and 18 months probation.

(3) On March 9, 1999, the applicant was convicted of Petty Theft with Prior Convictions and was sentenced to 30 days in jail and 2 years probation.

Here, fewer than 15 years have elapsed since the applicant committed the last violation. Therefore, the applicant is ineligible for the waiver provided by section 212(h) (1) (A) of the Act.

Section 212(h) (1) (B) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from inadmissibility under section 212(a) (2) (A) (i) (I) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. The key term in the provision is "extreme." Therefore, only in cases of great actual or prospective injury to the qualifying relative(s) will the bar be removed. Common results of the bar, such as separation or financial difficulties, in themselves, are insufficient to warrant approval of an application unless combined with much more extreme impacts. *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245 (Comm. 1984). "Extreme hardship" to an alien himself cannot be considered in determining eligibility for a section 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility. *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968).

The Board in *Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999), also referred to *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 983 (1971), where the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

The applicant in the present matter has been unlawfully present in the United States since 1989 and had been convicted of several crimes involving moral turpitude by March 9, 1999. It must be presumed that her husband was aware of this and the ramifications of such acts when they married in May 1999.

There are no laws that require a United States citizen to leave the United States and live abroad. Further, the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. It is noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in *Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N 408 (BIA 1998), need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. The applicant in the present matter entered the United States in 1988, remained longer than authorized, was convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude through March 1999, and married her spouse in May 1999. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. However, as previously noted, a consideration of the Attorney General's discretion is applicable only after extreme hardship has been established.

The record reflects that the applicant's child, [REDACTED] actually lives with the applicant's employer so that she can attend a charter school in San Carlos, CA. The record also indicates that the applicant's husband is employed and suggests that he would suffer hardship only from separation.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, fails to establish the existence of hardship over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in the deportation of a family member that reaches the level of extreme as envisioned by Congress if the applicant is not allowed to remain in the United States. It is concluded that the applicant has not established the qualifying degree of hardship in this matter.

The grant or denial of the above waiver does not turn only on the issue of the meaning of "extreme hardship." It also hinges on the discretion of the Attorney General and pursuant to such terms, conditions, and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe. Since the applicant has failed to establish the existence of extreme hardship, no purpose would be served in discussing a favorable exercise of discretion at this time.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.