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U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE  
425 Eye Street N.W.  
BCIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F  
Washington, D.C. 20536

**PUBLIC COPY**



**MAY 14 2003**

FILE:

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date:

IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under  
Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8  
U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: Self-represented

INSTRUCTIONS:

**Identifying data deleted to  
prevent clearly unwarranted  
invasion of personal privacy**

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Bureau) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

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**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having attempted to procure admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation in March 1989. The applicant was present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole in May 1989. She had married a native and citizen of Mexico in Mexico in February 1989. Her husband became a temporary resident in May 1988 and a lawful permanent resident in December 1990. The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative. She seeks the above waiver under section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

The director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant states that she needs to be near her daughter [REDACTED] born in June 1990) due to the daughter's illness, Juvenile Rheumatoid Arthritis. The applicant submits two medical reports containing a physician's evaluation of the daughter in medical terms. It appears that the daughter has contracture of fingers in both hands and is progressing slowly. The applicant has failed to provide an evaluation of that condition by a physician in layman's terms or a physician's prognosis for review.

The record reflects that the applicant attempted to procure admission into the United States on March 10, 1989, by presenting a Border Crossing Card belonging to another person. The applicant was convicted on March 10, 1989, of the charge of Conspiracy to Elude Inspection in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325, and she was sentenced to 45 days in jail. The applicant was voluntarily returned to Mexico following the completion of her sentence. She unlawfully entered the United States shortly thereafter. It is noted that in all prior proceedings she alleged that her true name was Margarita Lopez Sanchez and unmarried.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in part, that:

(i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

(1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of

subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Secretary regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) violation due to passage of time. Nothing could be clearer than Congress' desire in recent years to limit, rather than extend, the relief available to aliens who have committed fraud or misrepresentation. These amendments are applicable to pending cases. See *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999). Congress has almost unfettered power to decide which aliens may come to and remain in this country. This power has been recognized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See *Fiallo v. Bell*, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); *Kleindienst v. Mandel*, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). See also *Matter of Yeung*, 21 I&N Dec. 610, 612 (BIA 1997).

Congress has increased the penalties on fraud and willful misrepresentation, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar and eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship. Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for section 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. See *Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board) stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact

of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

The Board noted in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* that the alien's wife knew that he was in deportation proceedings at the time they were married. The Board stated that this factor goes to the wife's expectations at the time they were wed. The alien's wife was aware that she may have to face the decision of parting from her husband or following him to Mexico in the event he was ordered deported. The alien's wife was also aware that a move to Mexico would separate her from her family in the United States. The Board found this to undermine the alien's argument that his wife will suffer extreme hardship if he is deported. The Board then refers to *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), where the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.

The applicant in the present matter has been unlawfully present in the United States since May 1989 and following her conviction and sentence to jail. It must be presumed that her husband was aware of that and the possibility of being separated from the applicant if the applicant was placed in removal proceedings.

The Board in *Cervantes-Gonzalez*, *supra*, also referred to *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 983 (1971), where the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

The court held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

There are no laws that require a United States citizen or lawful resident alien who is not subject to removal to leave the United States and live abroad. Further, the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported.

Though the applicant has provided documentation relating to her daughter's medical condition, as noted above, in proceedings under section 212(i) hardship must be shown to a citizen or lawful permanent resident **spouse or parent**. Children are not a consideration in these proceedings. The only qualifying relative in this case is her husband and no information was provided as to any hardship he would experience should she be removed.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that the qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in the removal of a family member. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.