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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

**identifying data deleted to
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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE
425 Eye Street N.W.
BCIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F
Washington, D.C. 20536



MAY 14 2003

FILE:  Office: Miami Date:

IN RE: Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under
Section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:


DUPLICATE COPY

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Bureau) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

MAY1403_06H2212

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Acting District Director, Miami, Florida, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Cuba who was found to be inadmissible to the United States by an immigration judge under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and he was ordered excluded and deported on February 8, 1996. The applicant is the son of a naturalized U.S. citizen and seeks to adjust his status under section 201 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment & Central American Relief Act, Pub.L. 105-100 (NACARA). The applicant seeks a waiver of this permanent bar to admission as provided under section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), based on the hardship that would be imposed on his mother and son.

The acting district director noted that the applicant's child's mother has legal custody of the child and that the applicant's mother lives with her husband, the applicant's stepfather. The acting district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed upon United States citizen child and mother and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant's removal would impose extreme hardship on the applicant's child and on the applicant's mother. Counsel indicates that the applicant would only be able to find low paying employment in Cuba and would be unable to remit any amount of money to his son. Counsel further states that the applicant would probably be persecuted there for having previously left. Counsel indicates that the applicant's mother would suffer psychological and physical hardship due to the applicant's departure because he is her only child in this country.

The record reflects that the applicant has an extensive criminal record extending from August 25, 1981, to March 4, 1998. The record has been thoroughly discussed in prior proceedings and need not be revisited on appeal.

Section 212(a)(2) of the Act states in pertinent part, that:

(A)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime,...is inadmissible.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in part, that:-The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I),...or subsection (a)(2) and subparagraph (A)(i)(II) of such subsection

insofar as it relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana if-

(1) (A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that-

(i)...the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,

(ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and

(iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien;...and

(2) the Attorney General in his discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or for adjustment of status. No waiver shall be provided under this subsection in the case of an alien who has been convicted of (or who has admitted committing acts that constitute) murder or criminal acts involving torture, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit murder or a criminal act involving torture. No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if either since the date of such admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony or the alien has not lawfully resided continuously in the United States for a period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of initiation of proceedings to remove the alien from the United States. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver under this subsection.

Here, fewer than 15 years have elapsed since the applicant committed the last violation. Therefore, the applicant is ineligible for the waiver provided by section 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act.

Nothing could be clearer than Congress' desire in recent years to limit, rather than extend, the relief available to aliens who have committed crimes involving moral turpitude. In addition to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, this intent was recently seen in the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, which relates to criminal aliens. Congress has almost unfettered power to decide which aliens may come to and remain in this country. This power has been recognized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See *Fiallo v. Bell*, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); *Kleindienst v. Mandel*, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). See also *Matter of Yeung*, 21 I&N Dec. 610, 612 (BIA 1997).

Section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. The key term in the provision is "extreme." Therefore, only in cases of great actual or prospective injury to the qualifying relative(s) will the bar be removed. Common results of the bar, such as separation or financial difficulties, in themselves, are insufficient to warrant approval of an application unless combined with much more extreme impacts. *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245 (Comm. 1984). "Extreme hardship" to an alien himself cannot be considered in determining eligibility for a section 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility. *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968).

In *Matter of Goldeshtein*, 20 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 1991), *rev'd on other grounds*, 8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 1993), the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board) held that an application for discretionary relief, including a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, may be denied in the exercise of discretion without express rulings on the question of statutory eligibility. In that matter, the immigration judge found that there may be extreme hardship in that particular case but denied the waiver request as a matter of discretion because the applicant's offense was "very serious." See *INS v. Rios-Pineda*, 471 U.S. 444, 449 (1985); *INS v. Bagamasbad*, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976).

The record reflects that the applicant's extensive history of offenses is very serious, and he does not warrant a favorable exercise of discretion. In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.