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U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

**H3**

[Redacted]

FILE:

[Redacted]

Office: VIENNA, AUSTRIA

Date: **JUN 09 2004**

IN RE:

Applicant: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Assistant Officer in Charge, Vienna, Austria, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of the Ukraine who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of one year or more. The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative and approved petition for a K-3 nonimmigrant visa filed on Form I-129F as the spouse of a U.S. citizen. He now seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) in order to travel to the United States and reside with his spouse and stepchildren.

The Assistant Officer in Charge concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. *See Assistant Officer in Charge Decision* dated December 2, 2003.

The record reflects that the applicant was admitted to the United States as a non-immigrant visitor on February 19, 1999, for a period of six months, expiring on August 19, 1999. On March 5, 1999, the applicant married a U.S. citizen. His spouse filed a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) on his behalf. On July 12, 2000, the applicant's spouse requested that the Form I-130 she filed on behalf of the applicant be withdrawn. In October 2001 the applicant applied for asylum. His asylum application was denied on March 1, 2002, and he was granted voluntary departure until May 2, 2002. The applicant departed the United States on March 13, 2002. The applicant accrued unlawful presence in excess of one year making him inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who -

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). After reviewing the IIRIRA amendments to the Act regarding fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence in the United States and after noting the increased impediments Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-

inclusion of the perpetual bar, in some instances, eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, and providing a ground of inadmissibility for unlawful presence after April 1, 1997, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence of aliens in the United States.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the applicant did not accrue unlawful presence in excess of one year because he filed an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) in January 2000. Counsel further states that the applicant and his spouse had separated in November 1999 and a final divorce decree was issued on June 27, 2000. Neither the record of proceeding nor the electronic records of Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS) reveal that the applicant filed Form I-485 in January 2000. Electronic records do indicate that a visa packet was filed in Los Angeles on April 28, 2000. The AAO assumes that this would be the I-485 associated with the initial I-130. Even with the uncertain filing date of the I-485, the applicant accrued unlawful presence from June 27, 2000, the date of his divorce that automatically voided his Form I-485 application, until October 2001 the date he filed an application for asylum. The applicant is, therefore, inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(II) of the Act for being unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year.

As stated above, section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In the present case, the applicant must demonstrate extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse.

*Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the BIA deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

On appeal, counsel asserts that CIS failed to correctly assess extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse (Ms. Thomopoulos-Danilov). In support of this assertion, counsel submits a brief, and letters of recommendation from family and friends regarding the applicant's character. In the brief counsel states that Ms. Thomopoulos-Danilov would suffer emotionally and financially if her spouse's waiver application was not approved. Furthermore, in the brief counsel states that it would be impossible for Ms. Thomopoulos-Danilov to relocate to the Ukraine in order to join her husband because she would not be able to take her children from her previous marriage with her. Additionally counsel states that if Ms. Thomopoulos-Danilov decides to relocate with the applicant in Ukraine she would not be able to pursue employment opportunities and her business in the United States would collapse.

There are no laws that require Ms. [REDACTED] to leave the United States and live abroad. In *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F. 2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal

Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States.” The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represent the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. *See Shooshtary v. INS*, 39 F. 3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).

In her affidavit Ms. [REDACTED] states: “.... Our children are sad their father is not home, and cry, and want him home badly... . It is hurting all of us to be apart like this. . . .”

As mentioned, section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the qualifying family member, citizen or lawfully resident *spouse or parent* of such alien. Congress specifically did not mention extreme hardship to U.S. citizen or resident alien children or stepchildren. The assertions regarding the hardship the applicant’s stepchildren would suffer will thus not be considered.

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. The BIA noted in *Cervantes-Gonzalez*, that the alien’s wife knew that he was in deportation proceedings at the time they were married. The BIA stated that this factor went to the wife’s expectations at the time they wed because she was aware she might have to face the decision of parting from the husband or follow him to Mexico in the event he was ordered deported. The BIA found this to undermine the alien’s argument that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if he were deported. *Id.*

In the present case Ms. [REDACTED] was aware of the applicant’s immigration violation and the possibility of not being able to enter the United States at the time of their marriage on July 3, 2002.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined “extreme hardship” as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *Hassan v. INS, supra*, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. The U.S. Supreme Court additionally held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality reflects that the applicant has failed to show that his U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he was not permitted to travel to the United States at this time. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.