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U.S. Citizenship  
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
Date: **APR 01 2005**

IN RE:



APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Interim District Director, Los Angeles, California. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was determined to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant married a citizen of the United States on November 27, 2000. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to reside in the United States with her spouse and child.

The interim district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Interim District Director*, dated August 26, 2003.

On appeal, the applicant states that the adjudicating officer erred in concluding that she did not qualify for the waiver. *Form I-290B*, undated.

In support of this assertion, the applicant's spouse submits a brief, dated October 6, 2003. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

In the present application, the record indicates that the applicant entered the United States during July 1996 without inspection. The applicant departed from the United States during August 1999. The applicant accrued unlawful presence from April 1, 1997, the date of enactment of unlawful presence provisions under the Act, until August 1999, the date of her departure from the United States. The applicant is, therefore, inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for being unlawfully present in the United States for a period of one year or more. Pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), the applicant was barred from again seeking admission within ten years of the date of her departure. The AAO notes that the applicant reentered the United States during March 2000 without inspection.

A section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship the alien herself experiences upon deportation is irrelevant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver proceedings. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

*Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the Board of Immigration Appeals deems relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

The applicant's spouse states that the applicant has a legal permanent resident child who would be subjected to extreme hardship if the applicant were not granted a waiver of inadmissibility. *Appeal Brief*, dated October 6, 2003. The AAO notes that waiver proceedings under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act consider extreme hardship imposed on the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant; the statute does not provide for consideration of hardship to the lawfully resident child of the applicant. Moreover, the record reflects that the applicant's child is currently 21 years of age and maintains employment to sustain him financially. *See Form I-485*, dated May 10, 2001. *See also Letter from Ruben de Jesus Rodriguez Mora*, dated September 23, 2002. The applicant's spouse states that if the waiver is not granted, the applicant's adult child will be forced to either depart to an unknown place or to remain in the United States away from his mother. *Appeal Brief at 2*. The record reflects that the applicant's child resided in Mexico for a considerable portion of his life and therefore his native country does not constitute a place "unknown" to him. Furthermore, the applicant's child resided in Mexico while the applicant resided in the United States and therefore has been separated from his mother during prior years at much younger ages.

The applicant's spouse contends that Ninth Circuit case law has recognized claims such as those he is making and that the Court has provided legal grounds to exercise favorable discretion. *Id.* at 3. The AAO notes that the applicant's spouse fails to provide documentation substantiating this assertion. Unsupported, the assertion is unpersuasive.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *Hassan v. INS*, *supra*, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. Moreover, the AAO notes that the U.S. Supreme Court held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship. The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse would endure hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. However, his situation, based on the record, is typical to individuals separated as a result of deportation or exclusion and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.