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
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U.S. Citizenship  
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


FILE: [Redacted] Office: CIUDAD JUAREZ, MEXICO Date: OCT 30 2007  
CDJ2003 794 066 (RELATES)

IN RE: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v)  
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Robert P. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more subsequent to April 1, 1997. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse.

The record reflects that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in July 2002. The applicant had married her spouse, [REDACTED] a native of Mexico who became a naturalized U.S. citizen on January 28, 1999, in Mexico on June 26, 2002. The applicant subsequently departed the United States in April 2004. The applicant filed an Application for Immigrant Visa (Form DS-230) and Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability in April 2005.

The OIC concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the waiver application accordingly. *Decision of OIC*, dated December 2, 2005.

On appeal, counsel submits additional evidence of hardship.

The record contains declarations from the applicant's spouse dated December 1, 2005 and October 4, 2005; a letter from [REDACTED], with a copy of a prescription for an anti-anxiety drug attached; a letter from [REDACTED], a Licensed Clinical Social Worker; family photographs; documentation of money transfers from the applicant's spouse to the applicant in Mexico.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States . . . prior to the commencement of proceedings under section 235(b)(1) or section 240, and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, or

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

.....

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The record reflects that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in July 2002. The applicant subsequently departed the United States in April 2004 and applied for an immigrant visa at the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. Thus, the applicant accrued unlawful presence from July 2002 through the date of her departure in April 2004, a period in excess of one year.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, *i.e.*, the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her child is not relevant under the statute and will be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative in the application. The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the Secretary then assesses whether an exercise of discretion is warranted. Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act; *see also Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative “is not . . . fixed and inflexible,” and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566.

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.

*Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, “the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States,” and also, “[w]hen the BIA fails to give

considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion.” *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); *Cerrillo-Perez v. INS*, 809 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding to BIA) (“We have stated in a series of cases that the hardship to the alien resulting from his separation from family members may, in itself, constitute extreme hardship.”) (citations omitted). Separation of family will therefore be given appropriate weight in the assessment of hardship factors in the present case.

An analysis under *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* is appropriate. The AAO notes that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must be established in the event that he or she accompanies the applicant or in the event that he or she remains in the United States, as a qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant’s waiver request.

In his declarations, the applicant’s spouse states that separation from the applicant and their child has caused him “great agony and hardship that has affected [him] physically and mentally.” *Declaration of* [REDACTED] dated December 1, 2005. He indicates that he has “developed illnesses for which [he has] been receiving medical treatment...” *Id.* He indicates that he is the sole financial support for his family and worries about the health of his child in the substandard conditions where she and the applicant reside in Mexico. *Declaration of* [REDACTED], dated October 4, 2005.

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant’s spouse faces extreme hardship if the applicant is not granted a waiver of inadmissibility.

The AAO recognizes that the applicant’s spouse suffers emotionally as a result of separation from the applicant. However, the applicant has submitted insufficient evidence showing that the psychological consequences of separation in this case constitute extreme hardship and are an atypical result of removal or inadmissibility. Court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal or inadmissibility are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation.

The applicant has failed to submit evidence showing emotional or psychological hardship beyond the “anxiety” her spouse experiences from being separated from her and their child, a “condition” noted by Dr. [REDACTED] without elaboration concerning the precise nature of the condition or the medical treatment the applicant’s spouse is receiving. The AAO acknowledges that [REDACTED] a clinical social worker, states in her evaluation that the applicant suffers from major depression. Although the input of any mental health professional is respected and valuable, the AAO notes that the submitted letter of [REDACTED] is based on only a single interview between herself and the applicant’s spouse. The record fails to reflect an ongoing relationship between a mental health professional and the applicant’s spouse or a history of treatment for major depression suffered by the applicant’s spouse. Moreover, the conclusions reached in the submitted evaluation, being based on a single interview, do not reflect the insight and elaboration commensurate with an

established relationship with a psychologist or psychiatrist, thereby rendering the findings speculative and diminishing the evaluation's value to a determination of extreme hardship.

The AAO also notes that the applicant has failed to submit evidence showing that her spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he relocated to Mexico. The assertions made by the applicant's spouse concerning some of the living conditions in Mexico are not sufficient to meet the applicant's burden of proof. Although the statements by the applicant's spouse are relevant and have been taken into consideration, little weight can be afforded them in the absence of supporting evidence. *Matter of Kwan*, 14 I & N Dec. 175 (BIA 1972) ("Information in an affidavit should not be disregarded simply because it appears to be hearsay; in administrative proceedings, that fact merely affects the weight to be afforded it."). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998)(citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse as required under section 212(i) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.