



U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Public Copy

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536



JUL 19 2001

FILE: [Redacted] Office: VIENNA, AUSTRIA

Date:

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under §
212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

Identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Acting Director
Administrative Appeals Office



DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge, Vienna, Austria, and a subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Associate Commissioner for Examinations. The matter is now before the Associate Commissioner on a motion to reopen. The motion will be granted and the order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed. The application will be denied.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Macedonia who was found to be inadmissible to the United States by a consular officer under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of one year or more. The applicant married a native of Macedonia and naturalized U.S. citizen in Macedonia on August 12, 1998. He is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative and seeks the above waiver in order to travel to the United States to reside with his spouse.

The officer in charge determined that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed upon his wife and denied the application accordingly. The Associate Commissioner affirmed that decision on appeal.

On motion, counsel states that the applicant's inadmissibility under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) arises out of incorrect and inaccurate information that he received from a travel agency. Counsel asserts that the agency informed the applicant that he was ineligible to adjust his status to permanent residence while in the United States when he was in fact eligible to do so.

The issue of eligibility to apply for adjustment of status under § 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1255, is not the purpose of this proceeding. This proceeding is limited to the issue of whether or not the applicant meets the statutory and discretionary requirements necessary for the ground of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) to be waived.

On motion, the applicant's spouse states that the applicant was last admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure (B-2) in 1996. The record reflects that he remained in the United States unlawfully for a period of one year or more from April 1, 1997, the date the calculation for unlawful presence begins, until his departure for Macedonia in July 1998.

Section 212(a) of the Act states:

CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.-
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

* * *

(9) ALIENS PREVIOUSLY REMOVED.-

* * *

(B) ALIENS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT.-

(i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

* * *

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure from the United States, is inadmissible.

* * *

(v) WAIVER.-The Attorney General has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by the Attorney General regarding a waiver under this clause.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). An appeal must be decided according to the law as it exists on the date it is before the appellate body. See Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 710-1 (1974); Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996). In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered.

If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. Matter of George, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); Matter of Leveque, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

The Board has held that extreme hardship is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible meaning, and that the elements to establish extreme hardship are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. These factors should be viewed in light of the Board's statement that a restrictive view of extreme hardship is not mandated either by the Supreme Court or by its own case law. See Matter of L-O-G-, Interim Decision 3281 (BIA 1996).

It is noted that the requirements to establish extreme hardship in the present waiver proceedings under § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act do not include a showing of hardship to the alien as did former cases involving suspension of deportation. Present waiver proceedings require a showing of extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. This requirement is identical to the extreme hardship requirement stipulated in the amended fraud waiver proceedings under § 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(i). Therefore, it is deemed to be more appropriate to apply the meaning of the term "extreme hardship" as it is used in fraud waiver proceedings than to apply the meaning as it was used in former suspension of deportation cases.

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, Interim Decision 3380 (BIA 1999), the Board stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established "extreme hardship" in waiver proceedings under § 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; (2) the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; (3) the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; (4) the financial impact of departure from this country; (5) and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

In Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996) the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation.

The court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

On motion, counsel submits an affidavit from the applicant's spouse, evidence of the spouse's naturalization as a United States citizen, and documentation indicating that the couple's first child was scheduled for delivery on October 26, 2000. The applicant's spouse states that it is important for her husband to be with her for the child's birth and that her husband's presence is required after the child is born because she will be unable to work. The spouse also indicates that her husband is experiencing difficulties in finding employment in Macedonia due to political and economic conditions in that country. She asserts that it would be impossible to support the baby in Macedonia and that the child would not receive adequate medical care or have the same educational opportunities in that country as he/she would have in the United States.

It should be noted that there are no laws that require the applicant's spouse to leave the United States and live abroad. Further, the common results of deportation (inadmissibility) are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather

represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994). In Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

The assertion of financial hardship to the applicant's spouse advanced in the record is contradicted by the fact that, pursuant to § 213A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1183a, and the regulations at 8 C.F.R. 213a, the person who files an application for an immigrant visa or for adjustment of status on or after December 19, 1997 must execute a Form I-864 (Affidavit of Support) which is legally enforceable in behalf of a beneficiary (the applicant) who is an immediate relative or a family-sponsored immigrant when an applicant applies for an immigrant visa. The statute and the regulations do not provide for an alien beneficiary to execute an affidavit of support in behalf of a U.S. citizen or resident alien petitioner. Therefore, a claim that an alien beneficiary is needed for the purpose of supporting a citizen or resident alien petitioner can only be considered as a hardship in rare instances.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that the qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in the removal of a family member. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Matter of T--S--Y--, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed and the application will be denied.

ORDER: The Associate Commissioner's order of May 22, 2000 dismissing the appeal is affirmed. The application is denied.