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U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

[redacted]

File: [redacted] Office: SACRAMENTO, CA Date: MAY 15 2001

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

Application: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

Public Copy

Identification data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of $110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Acting Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge, Sacramento, California, and is now before the Associate Commissioner on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than one year. The applicant married a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1992 and is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative. She seeks the above waiver in order to remain in the United States and reside with her spouse and children.

The officer in charge determined that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the applicant has established that her spouse would suffer extreme hardship if her waiver request is denied and that she warrants a favorable exercise of the Attorney General's discretion to grant the request.

The record reflects that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in 1990. She remained unlawfully and did not depart the United States until on or about December 15, 1998 in order to return to Mexico to visit her parents. She was subsequently paroled into the United States on January 30, 1999 to pursue her application for adjustment of status.

Section 212(a) of the Act states:

> CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.- Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are ineligible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:
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> (9) ALIENS PREVIOUSLY REMOVED.-
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> (B) ALIENS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT.-
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> (i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

> (I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States (whether or not pursuant to § 244(e) [1254]) prior to the commencement of proceedings under § 235(b)(1) or § 240 [1229a], and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, is inadmissible.
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> * * *
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> (v) WAIVER.-The Attorney General has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by the Attorney General regarding a waiver under this clause.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). After reviewing the IIRIRA amendments to the Act relating to fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence in the United States, and after noting the increased penalties Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar in some instances, eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, and providing a ground of inadmissibility for unlawful presence after April 1, 1997, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence of aliens in the United States.

The Board has held that extreme hardship is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible meaning, and that the elements to establish extreme hardship are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. These factors should be viewed in light of the Board's statement that a restrictive view of extreme hardship is not mandated either by the Supreme Court or by its own case law. See Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413 (BIA 1996).

It is noted that the requirements to establish extreme hardship in the present waiver proceedings under § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act do not include a showing of hardship to the alien as did former cases involving suspension of deportation. Present waiver proceedings require a showing of extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. This requirement is identical to the extreme hardship requirement stipulated in the amended fraud waiver proceedings under § 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(i).

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, Interim Decision 3380 (BIA 1999), the Board stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established "extreme hardship" in waiver proceedings under § 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; (2) the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; (3) the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; (4) the financial impact of departure from this country; (5) and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant's immediate and extended family in the United States is extremely tight and close-knit. The applicant's spouse has lawfully resided in the United States for over ten years and has several relatives living in the United States. Counsel submits declarations from the applicant and her spouse; evidence of their marriage and the lawful permanent resident status of the spouse; copies of their two children's birth certificates; evidence that two of the spouse's uncles and one brother are lawful permanent residents of the United States; letters of support from family members, the spouse's employer, and their oldest child's teacher; as well as various articles and reports containing country conditions information on Mexico.

Due to the economic conditions existing in Mexico, the applicant and her spouse state that they have no choice but to separate if the applicant is not permitted to reside in the United States at this time. The couple have decided that the children will relocate to Mexico with the applicant while her spouse remains in the United States in order to support the family. Counsel asserts that this separation will cause extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse as he will unlikely be unable to visit his family in Mexico due to financial reasons. The spouse will constantly worry about his family while they are living in Mexico, negatively affecting his mental and emotional health.

Counsel asserts that should the spouse decide to live in Mexico,

the conditions in that country would negatively affect his ability to support his family and his general well-being. In addition, uprooting the family would be a diservice to the applicant's son who is in the second grade, has overcome a serious speech impediment, and does not adapt to change easily.

In Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.

The court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

There are no laws that require the applicant's spouse and/or children to leave the United States and live abroad. Further, the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994). In Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

It is noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in Matter of Tijam, Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998), need not be accorded great weight in considering the exercise of discretion. The applicant in the present matter initially entered the United States in 1990 without inspection and married her spouse in 1992. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. However, as previously noted, a consideration of the Attorney General's discretion is applicable only after extreme hardship has been established.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, fails to establish the existence of hardship to the applicant's spouse caused by separation that reaches the level of extreme as envisioned by Congress if the applicant is not allowed to remain in the United States at this time. Hardship to the applicant's children is not a consideration in these proceedings. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Matter of T--S--Y--, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.