




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U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Identification data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.



OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

FILE: EAC00 240 51145 Office: Vermont Service Center

Date: 6/11/02

IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under Section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT: Self-represented

Public Copy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

for Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application was denied by the Director and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Ecuador who attempted to procure admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation on November 17, 1999, by presenting a photo-switched passport and an altered nonimmigrant visa. Therefore she is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for having attempted to procure admission into the United States by fraud and for being an immigrant without a valid immigration visa or lieu document.

A Notice to Appear was served on her on November 26, 1999, and she was paroled into the United States to November 29, 2000, pending a removal hearing. The applicant was ordered removed from the United States *in absentia* by an immigration judge on February 2, 2000. Therefore, the applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). She seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii), to remain in the United States.

The director determined that the unfavorable factors outweighed the favorable ones and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant states that she is not a criminal, is a person of good moral character, helps her community, is a hard worker, files her tax returns, came here for a better future and would face extreme hardship if she returned to Ecuador. Issues regarding her application for asylum and fear of persecution will not be addressed in this proceeding. She was afforded the opportunity to present her claims to an immigration judge but failed to appear for the hearing.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act provides, in part, that:

(i) Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(ii) Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 of the Act or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

Section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act provides that aliens who have been otherwise ordered removed, ordered deported under former sections 242 or 217 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252 or 1187, or ordered excluded under former section 236 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1226, and who have actually been removed (or departed after such an order) are inadmissible for 10 years unless the Attorney General has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission. The provision holding aliens inadmissible for 10 years after the issuance of an exclusion or deportation order applies to such orders rendered both before and after April 1, 1997.

Section 212(a)(6)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(B), was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and is now codified as section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) and (ii). The provisions of any legislation modifying the Act must normally be applied to waiver applications adjudicated on or after the enactment date of that legislation, unless other instructions are provided. See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, Interim Decision 3380 (BIA 1999). IIRIRA became effective on September 30, 1996.

An appeal must be decided according to the law as it exists on the date it is before the appellate body. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered. Matter of Patel, 19 I&N Dec. 774, 779 (BIA 1988) (citing Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 710-1 (1974)). If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. Matter of George, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); Matter of Leveque, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

In IIRIRA, Congress imposed restrictions on benefits for aliens, enhanced enforcement and penalties for certain violations, eliminated judicial review of certain judgements or decisions under certain sections of the Act, created a new expedited removal

proceeding, and established major new grounds of inadmissibility. Nothing could be clearer than Congress's desire in recent years to limit, rather than to extend, the relief available to aliens who have violated immigration law. Congress has almost unfettered power to decide which aliens may come to and remain in this country. This power has been recognized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). See also Matter of Yeung, 21 I&N Dec. 610, 612 (BIA 1997).

Although guidelines for considering permission to reapply for admission applications were promulgated in Matter of Tin, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), and in Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978), these holdings were rendered long before Congress amended the Act from 1981 through the present 1996 IIRIRA amendments and beyond. It is specifically noted that the Commissioner in Matter of Lee, referred to the intent of Congress in enacting former sections 212(a)(16) and (17) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(16) and (17), in the conclusions and recommendations of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in their report dated 1950. The Committee also reviewed section 3 of the 1917 Act in their study.

Even though the decisions in Tin and Lee have not been overruled, Congress and the courts following the 1981 amendments and onward have clearly shown in their intent, and in the legislation and in their decisions, that individuals who violate immigration law are viewed unfavorably. The later statutes and judicial decisions have effectively negated most precedent case law rendered prior to 1981. Such case law is still considered but less weight is given to favorable factors gained after the violation of immigration laws following statutory changes and judicial decisions.

Even the Regional Commissioner in Tin held that an alien's unlawful presence in the United States is evidence of disrespect for law. The Regional Commissioner noted also that the applicant gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present subsequent to that return. The Regional Commissioner stated that the alien obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country. The Regional Commissioner then concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would appear to be a condonation of the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter without being admitted to work in the United States unlawfully.

After reviewing the 1996 IIRIRA amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, and after noting that Congress has increased the bar to admissibility from 5 to 10 years, has also added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted, it is

concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

It is appropriate to examine the basis of a removal as well as an applicant's general compliance with immigration and other laws. Evidence of serious disregard for law is viewed as an adverse factor. Family ties in the United States are an important consideration in deciding whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. Matter of Acosta, 14 I&N Dec. 361 (D.D. 1973).

The Service, following more recent judicial decisions, has accorded less weight to an applicant's equities gained after a deportation order is entered. The statute provides in section 240 of the Act, 8 U.S.C 1229, for the consideration of a certain amount of continuous physical presence in the United States for aliens seeking cancellation of removal. The present applicant is not seeking cancellation of removal.

The court held in Garcia-Lopez v. INS, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. Ghassan v. INS, 972 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 971 (1993). It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that after-acquired equities, referred to as "after-acquired family ties" in Matter of Tijam, Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998), need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight.

The favorable factor in this matter is the absence of a criminal record.

The unfavorable factors in this matter include the applicant's attempted entry by fraud, her failure to appear for the removal hearing, her failure to depart, and her unlawful presence in the United States following the expiration of her parole. The Commissioner stated in Matter of Lee, supra, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.



Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that he is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish the warranting of a favorable exercise of the Attorney General's discretion. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.