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Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

[REDACTED]

FIL [REDACTED] Office: Vermont Service Center

Date: JAN 2 1993

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under Section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT: Self-represented

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of El Salvador who was present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole on December 13, 1994. An Order to Show Cause was served on her on December 13, 1994. On March 3, 1995, an immigration judge ordered the applicant deported *in absentia*. Therefore, she is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii).

The applicant married a native of El Salvador on August 30, 1997, and she was granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) on February 9, 2002. Her husband and one child, born in El Salvador, were both granted TPS. She also has one U.S. citizen child. The record indicates that she is the derivative beneficiary of an immigrant visa petition filed by her husband's brother. The applicant seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii), to legalize her status.

The director determined that the unfavorable factors outweighed the favorable ones and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant states that a Form I-130 visa petition is pending, that she is a person of good moral character, that she has been granted TPS and her husband and son have also been granted TPS, that her family is not a public charge, and that it would be an extreme hardship for her to return to El Salvador. The applicant states that she never received the notice of hearing and it was never her intention to disregard any immigration laws.

The record reflects that the applicant provided the Service with the address 6833 Beechnut, #134, Houston, Texas 77074, when she was released from custody. At that time she was reminded that she must furnish the Service with any change of address, and she was provided with a Form EOIR-33, Change of Address. The Notice of Hearing was mailed to the Houston address provided, but was returned as unclaimed. An Affidavit of Witness in the record indicates that the witness met the applicant in Norwalk on December 24, 1994. It appears that the applicant was residing in Norwalk, Connecticut in December 1994 following her release from custody on December 13, 1994, and she failed to submit the Form EOIR-33 notifying the Service of her change of address. Therefore, her reason for not attending the hearing is without merit.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act provides, in part, that:

- (i) Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a

second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(ii) Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 of the Act or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

Section 212(a)(6)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(B), was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and is now codified as section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) and (ii). Section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the Act provides that aliens who have been ordered removed from the United States through expedited removal proceedings or removal proceedings initiated on the alien's arrival in the United States and who have actually been removed (or departed after such an order) are inadmissible for 5 years. Section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act provides that aliens who have otherwise ordered removed, ordered deported under section 242 or 217 of the Act or ordered excluded under section 236 of the Act and who have actually been removed (or departed after such an order) are inadmissible for 10 years.

In IIRIRA, Congress imposed restrictions on benefits for aliens, enhanced enforcement and penalties for certain violations, eliminated judicial review of certain judgments or decisions under certain sections of the Act, created a new expedited removal proceeding, and established major new grounds of inadmissibility. Nothing could be clearer than Congress's desire in recent years to limit, rather than to extend, the relief available to aliens who have violated immigration law. Congress has almost unfettered power to decide which aliens may come to and remain in this country. This power has been recognized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). See also Matter of Yeung, 21 I&N Dec. 610, 612 (BIA 1997).

Although guidelines for considering permission to reapply for admission applications were promulgated in Matter of Tin, 14 I&N

Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), and in Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978), these holdings were rendered long before Congress amended the Act from 1981 through the present 1996 IIRIRA amendments and beyond. It is specifically noted that the Commissioner in Matter of Lee, referred to the intent of Congress in enacting former sections 212(a)(16) and (17) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(16) and (17), in the conclusions and recommendations of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in their report dated 1950. The Committee also reviewed section 3 of the 1917 Act in their study.

Even though the decisions in Tin and Lee have not been overruled, Congress and the courts following the 1981 amendments and onward have clearly shown in their intent, and in the legislation and in their decisions, that individuals who violate immigration law are viewed unfavorably. The later statutes and judicial decisions have effectively negated most precedent case law rendered prior to 1981. Such case law is still considered but less weight is given to favorable factors gained after the violation of immigration laws following statutory changes and judicial decisions.

It is appropriate to examine the basis of a removal as well as an applicant's general compliance with immigration and other laws. Evidence of serious disregard for law is viewed as an adverse factor. Family ties in the United States are an important consideration in deciding whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. Matter of Acosta, 14 I&N Dec. 361 (D.D. 1973).

The Service, following more recent judicial decisions and the Congressional amendments, has accorded less weight to an applicant's equities gained following the commencement of removal proceedings, if the equities were gained while the applicant was unlawfully present in the United States or after a violation of law. The statute provides in section 240 of the Act, 8 U.S.C § 1229, for the consideration of a certain amount of continuous physical presence in the United States for aliens seeking cancellation of removal. The present applicant is not seeking cancellation of removal.

The court held in Garcia-Lopez v. INS, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. Ghassan v. INS, 972 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 971 (1993). It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that after-acquired equities, referred to as "after-acquired family ties" in Matter of Tijam, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998), need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. The applicant in the present matter entered the United States unlawfully in December 1994, was apprehended and released

for hearing. She failed to provide the Service with a change of address, failed to attend the hearing, was ordered deported in absentia in March 1995, and married her spouse in August 1997. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity.

The favorable factors in this matter are the applicant's family ties, her approval for TPS, the absence of a criminal record, the approved visa petition, and the prospect of general hardship to the family.

The unfavorable factors in this matter include the applicant's unlawful entry, her failure to provide the Service with a change of address, her failure to appear for the removal hearing, her failure to depart, and her lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in Matter of Lee, supra, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. Her equity (marriage and eligibility for derivative immigrant status) gained while being unlawfully present in the United States (and entered into while in deportation proceedings) can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Attorney General's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.