U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Mass, Rm. A3042, 425 I Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20529

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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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JUL 20 2004

FILE: [redacted] Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date:

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permission to reapply for admission after removal was denied by the Director, California Service Center and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Italy who entered the United States on January 8, 1999, as a non-immigrant visitor under the Visa Waiver Pilot Program. On February 10, 2000, the applicant was found deportable under section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for having remained in the United States longer than permitted. On February 16, 2000, he was removed to Italy pursuant to section 235(b)(1) of the Act. The applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). He seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to travel to the United States to reside with his U.S. citizen spouse and child.

The Director determined that the unfavorable factors in the applicant's case outweighed the favorable factors, and denied the applicant's Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission After Removal (Form I-212) accordingly. *See Director's Decision* dated September 2, 2003.

Section 212(a)(9). Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain alien previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception. – Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens' reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the aliens' reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 IIRIRA amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years for others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens

who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

The record reflects that on May 26, 1999, in the Municipal Court of California, County of Fresno the applicant was convicted for the offense of Driving Under the Influence. In addition on September 15, 1999, in the Municipal Court of California, County of Fresno the applicant was convicted for the offense of Driving under Suspended/Revoked License.

On appeal the applicant and his spouse submit affidavits in which they state that they and their child would suffer hardship if the applicant were not permitted to travel to the United States at this time. In his affidavit the applicant addresses his convictions and states that drinking and driving was part of his culture. In addition he states that he was arrested for driving with a suspended/revoke license because he did not want to leave a van in which he was a passenger stranded after it had broken down. He further states that his spouse and child would suffer financially in Italy because he does not have a steady job and Ms. would not be able to pursue employment opportunities in Italy because she does not speak the language. In her affidavit states that she must return to the United States in order to finish her post graduate studies and she needs the applicant in order to assist her with their child while she attends graduate school. In addition she states that she may have to make the choice of separating her family in order to continue her education and fulfill her obligation to work for the government for two year after her graduation. further states that her family has missed important events in her life such as her marriage and the birth and christening of her daughter since she has been living in Italy.

There are no laws that require or her child to live abroad. In *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F. 2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States." The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. *See Shooshtary v. INS,* 39 F. 3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).

In *Matter of Tin,* 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

> The basis of deportation; the recency of the deportation; the length of legal residence in the U.S.; the applicant's moral character and his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; the applicant's family responsibilities; and hardship to the applicant's family if the applicant were not allowed to return to the U.S.

Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

> [T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] . . . . In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

In *Tin,* the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would be a condonation of the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter without being admitted to work in the United States unlawfully. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia–Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v.INS,* 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS,* 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter entered the United States in 1999, fell out of lawful status, was ordered excluded and deported, was removed from the United States on February 16, 2000, and married his U.S. citizen spouse on July 29, 2002, in Italy, approximately two and one half years after his deportation from the United States. He now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity.

The favorable factors in this matter are the applicant's family ties to U.S. citizens (spouse and child) and the approval of a petition for alien relative on his behalf.

The unfavorable factors in this matter include the applicant's overstay after his initial lawful admission, his criminal history, his illegal stay and employment in the United States and his lengthy presence in the United States without authorization. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra,* that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. His equity, marriage to a U.S. citizen, gained after his deportation from the United States can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that

the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.