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Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services



FILE:



Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

JUN 01 2004  
Date:

IN RE:


Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after  
Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and  
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Form I-212, Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal, was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of El Salvador who entered the United States without a lawful admission or parole on or about June 25, 1977. On July 27, 1977, the applicant was deported from the United States pursuant to section 241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act). The record reflects that the applicant reentered the United States on an unknown date without a lawful admission or parole and without permission to reapply for admission in violation of section 276 of Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a felony). On July 13, 1984, the applicant was removed from the United States at the San Ysidro, California Port of entry. The record further reflects that the applicant reentered the United States after his second deportation without a lawful admission or parole and without permission to reapply for admission in violation of section 276 the Act. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). He seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with his spouse and children.

The director determined that the applicant was inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and that section 241(a)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) applies in this matter. Additionally the Director found that the applicant is not eligible for a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act. The Director then denied the application accordingly. See *Director Decision* dated August 13, 2003.

The record reflects that on January 16, 1979, and January 14, 1983, in the Superior Court of California, County of Las Angeles, the applicant was convicted on two different occasions for the offense of Robbery in violation of section 211 of the California Penal Code. The records further reflects the following arrests and convictions: November 18, 1988, convicted for Battery Peace Officer; August 25, 1989, convicted for Inflict Corporal Injury on Spouse/Cohabitant and November 17, 1989, convicted for Driving under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs. The applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, due to his convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude.

Section 212(a)(2) of the Act states in pertinent part, that:

(A)(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

. . . .

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(h) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs (A)(i)(I) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if-

. . . .

(1) (B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General

[Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . . .

No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if either since the date of such admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony or the alien has not lawfully resided continuously in the United States for a period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of initiation of proceedings to remove the alien from the United States.

The AAO finds the director erred in his decision stating that the applicant is a former lawful permanent resident who has been convicted of an aggravated felon and is inadmissible without exceptions or waivers. The record of proceedings does not reflect that the applicant was ever admitted into the United States as a lawful permanent resident.

Additionally, the AAO finds that the director erred in his decision finding that section 241(a)(5) of the Act is applicable in this case.

The applicant's illegal reentry into the United States occurred prior to the April 1, 1997 enactment date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 303(b)(3), 110 Stat. 3009.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in *Castro-Cortez v. INS*, 239 F.3d 1037 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) that section 241(a)(5) of the Act was not retroactive and did not apply to illegal reentries that occurred prior to its April 1, 1997 enactment.

Since this case arises in the Ninth Circuit, *Castro-Cortez* is controlling and section 241(a)(5) of the Act is not applicable in this case.

Nevertheless, this office finds the director's errors to be harmless. The applicant is clearly inadmissible under sections 212(a)(2) and 212(a)(9) of the Act.

Section 212(a)(9). Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain alien previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception. – Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens' reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the aliens' reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 IIRIRA amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years for others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant is the beneficiary of a Petition for Alien Relative filed by his Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) spouse, is the father of five U.S. citizen children and that the crimes committed date back to 1979, 1988 and 1989. In addition counsel states that the applicant is eligible for a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act and that extreme hardship would be imposed upon his spouse.

The applicant has not filed an Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act and the record of proceedings in the instant case deals only with his Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis of deportation; the recency of the deportation; the length of legal residence in the U.S.; the applicant's moral character and his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; the applicant's family responsibilities; and hardship to if the applicant were not allowed to return to the U.S.

*Matter of Lee*, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] . . . . In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would be a condonation of the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter without being admitted to work in the United States unlawfully. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

In the present case, it appears that that the applicant's spouse was aware of the applicant's immigration violations and the possibility of being removed at the time of their marriage on September 15, 1986.

The favorable factors in this matter are the applicant's family ties to his LPR spouse and U.S. citizen children and the approval of a petition for alien relative.

The unfavorable factors in this matter include the applicant's illegal entry into the United States in June 1977, his extensive criminal history, his convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude, his illegal re-entries subsequent to his removals, his employment without authorization, his lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole and his continued disregard and abuse of the laws of this country. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. His equity, marriage to a LPR, gained after he was deported twice can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.