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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Mass, Rm. A3042, 425 I Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE:



Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

JUN 16 2004
Date:

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after
Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Form I-212, Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal, was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without a lawful admission or parole on or about January 5, 1993. On January 8, 1993, the applicant was removed from the United States pursuant to section 241(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act). The record reflects that the applicant reentered the United States on or about January 9, 1993, without a lawful admission or parole and without permission to reapply for admission in violation of section 276 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a felony). The applicant married a now naturalized U.S. citizen on February 20, 1997. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). He seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with his spouse and children.

The director determined that section 241(a)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) applies in this matter and the applicant is not eligible and may not apply for any relief and denied the Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission After Removal (Form I-212) accordingly. See *Director Decision* dated December 10, 2003.

Section 241(a) detention, release, and removal or aliens ordered removed.-

(5) reinstatement of removal orders against aliens illegally reentering.- if the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this Act, and the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.

The AAO finds that the director erred in his decision finding that section 241(a)(5) of the Act is applicable in this case.

The applicant's illegal reentry into the United States occurred prior to the April 1, 1997, enactment date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 303(b)(3), 110 Stat. 3009.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in *Castro-Cortez v. INS*, 239 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2001) that section 241(a)(5) of the Act was not retroactive and did not apply to illegal reentries that occurred prior to its April 1, 1997, enactment.

Since this case arises in the Ninth Circuit, *Castro-Cortez* is controlling and section 241(a)(5) of the Act is not applicable in this case.

Nevertheless, this office finds the director's errors to be harmless. The applicant is clearly inadmissible under section 212(a)(9) of the Act.

Section 212(a)(9). Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain alien previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception. - Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens' reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the aliens' reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 IIRIRA amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years for others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief, letters of recommendation from friends regarding the applicant's character, copies of the applicant's children's birth certificates and tax returns. In his brief counsel states that the applicant is the beneficiary of a Petition for Alien Relative filed by his naturalized U.S. citizen spouse (Ms. [REDACTED] that he is the father of five U.S. citizen children who would suffer extreme hardship if the waiver application were denied. Counsel further states that if the application is denied [REDACTED] and her children would suffer financially because the applicant would not be able to contribute to their financial needs.

If the applicant is removed to Mexico his U.S. spouse and children would suffer hardship, but there is no indication that this will impact them at a level commensurate with extreme hardship. If [REDACTED] and her children were to accompany the applicant to Mexico, it would be expected that some economic, linguistic and cultural difficulties would arise. No evidence exists that [REDACTED] and her children would not be able to adjust to life in Mexico if they were to relocate with the applicant.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis of deportation; the recency of the deportation; the length of legal residence in the U.S.; the applicant's moral character and his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; the applicant's family responsibilities; and hardship to if the applicant were not allowed to return to the U.S.

Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would be a condonation of the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter without being admitted to work in the United States unlawfully. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter entered the United States in January 1993 was removed from the United States, reentered illegally on or about January 9, 1993, and married his U.S. citizen spouse on February 20, 1997. He now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. Additionally, it appears that the applicant's spouse was aware of the applicant's immigration violation and the possibility of being removed at the time of their marriage on February 20, 1997.

The favorable factors in this matter are the applicant's family ties to U.S. citizens (spouse and children), the approval of a petition for alien relative, the prospect of general hardship to his family and the favorable recommendations.

The unfavorable factors in this matter include the applicant's illegal entry into the United States in January 1993, his illegal re-entry subsequent to his removal, his employment without authorization and his lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. His equity, marriage to a U.S. citizen gained after his removal from the United States and his subsequent illegal reentry can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.