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U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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FILE: [Redacted] Office: BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

Date: JUN 22 2004

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after  
Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and  
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Form I-212, Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal, was denied by the Acting District Director, Baltimore, Maryland, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native of Mexico and citizen of Canada who on April 14, 1997, was found inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), for knowingly encouraging, assisting, abetting, aiding any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law. The applicant was served a Notice to Appear for removal proceedings scheduled for July 22, 1997, in Buffalo, New York. She failed to appear for the removal hearing and on July 22, 1997, the applicant was ordered removed in absentia by an Immigration Judge. On November 20, 1998, a motion to reopen the removal proceedings was denied by an Immigration Judge. The record reflects that the applicant reentered the United States in March 2000, without a lawful admission or parole and without permission to reapply for admission in violation of section 276 of Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a felony). The applicant married a naturalized U.S. citizen on February 12, 2001. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). She seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with her spouse and children.

The Acting District Director determined that the unfavorable factors in the applicant's case outweighed the favorable factors and denied the applicant's Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission After Removal (Form I-212) accordingly. *See Acting District Director's decision* dated July 23, 2003.

Section 212(a)(9). Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain alien previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception. - Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens' reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the aliens' reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 IIRIRA amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years for others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

On appeal counsel submits a brief, affidavits from the applicant and her spouse and letters of recommendation regarding the applicant's character. In the brief counsel asserts that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now known as Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)) failed to consider all the favorable factors, which far outweigh the single negative factor of self-deportation. Additionally in the brief and in the affidavits submitted it is stated that if the applicant is not permitted to reside in the United States her U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship. The applicant also stated that she was not aware of her ex-husband's inadmissibility into the United States. The AAO finds this not persuasive since in her sworn statement dated August 14, 1997, the applicant admitted knowing his of inadmissibility.

Unlike sections 212(g), (h), and (i) of the Act (which relate to waivers of inadmissibility for prospective immigrants), section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act does not specify hardship threshold requirements which must be met. An applicant for permission to reapply for admission into the United States after deportation or removal need not establish that a particular level of hardship would result to a qualifying family member if the application were denied.

If extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See *Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In the brief counsel states that if the applicant is not permitted to reside in the United States her spouse (Mr. [REDACTED]) may be forced to relocate to Mexico with the applicant and would suffer extreme hardship due to his financial commitments in the United States, his lengthy residence, the financial impact of the applicant's departure, lack of family and other ties elsewhere and his contribution to and ties to a community in the United States. In her affidavit the applicant states that Mr. [REDACTED] would suffer extreme hardship if he were to give up his business and relocate to Mexico and it would be impossible for him to start a successful business in another country. Mr. [REDACTED] states that he and the applicant's children would suffer extreme hardship if the applicant were not permitted to reside in the United States. Mr. [REDACTED] states that if the applicant were not permitted to reside in the United States he would be forced to move to Mexico where he has no family or employment opportunities. He further states that if the applicant returned to Mexico he and his family would all suffer severe emotional distress. No documentation was provided to the AAO to substantiate the claim of financial impact the applicant's departure would pose on Mr. [REDACTED]. While the AAO understands that familial separation is difficult, the emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship.

There are no laws that require Mr. [REDACTED] to leave the United States and live abroad. In *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F. 2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more that to say

that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States.” The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represent the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. *See Shooshtary v. INS*, 39 F. 3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis of deportation; the recency of the deportation; the length of legal residence in the U.S.; the applicant’s moral character and his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; the applicant’s family responsibilities; and hardship to if the applicant were not allowed to return to the U.S.

*Matter of Lee*, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] . . . . In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would be a condonation of the alien’s acts and could encourage others to enter without being admitted to work in the United States unlawfully. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien’s possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter entered the United States in March 2000 and married her U.S. citizen spouse on February 12, 2001, years after a final removal order was issued. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity.

The favorable factors in this matter are the applicant's family tie to her U.S. citizen spouse, the approval of a petition for alien relative and the prospect of general hardship to her family.

The unfavorable factors in this matter include the applicant's attempt in April 1997 to assist her ex-spouse to enter the United States knowing that he was inadmissible, her failure to appear for removal proceedings, her unlawful reentry in March 2000 without permission and her lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. Her equity, marriage to a U.S. citizen, gained after a final removal order was issued can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.