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U.S. Citizenship  
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Services



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


Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date: **NOV 18 2004**


IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission after Removal into the United States after Deportation under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Form I-212, Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal, was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native of Palestine who entered the United States on December 16, 1988 as a student. The applicant applied for asylum on June 7, 1993, with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Citizenship and Immigration Services, (CIS)). The applicant was interviewed for asylum status and on February 7, 1997, he was referred to an Immigration Judge for a court hearing. The record reflects that on July 10, 1997, an Immigration Judge granted the applicant voluntary departure until January 10, 1998, in lieu of removal. The applicant filed an application for extension of his voluntary departure, which was granted until January 10, 1999. On January 19, 2002, an Immigration Judge denied his motion to reopen his case and on May 3, 2002 the board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. On September 10, 2002, the BIA denied a motion to reopen filed by the applicant. The applicant failed to surrender for removal or depart from the United States. The applicant is therefore inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). He seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain and reside in the United States with his U.S. citizen spouse.

The District Director determined that the unfavorable factors in the applicant's case outweighed the favorable factors and denied the applicant's Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission After Removal (Form I-212) accordingly. *See District Director's decision* dated October 30, 2003.

Section 212(a)(9). Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain alien previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception. - Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens' reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 IIRIRA amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years for others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief, copies of the applicant's marriage certificate, an affidavit from the applicant's spouse, the applicant's spouse's medical history and letters of recommendation regarding his character. In addition counsel requests an oral argument in order to address the issues that surround the waiver application.

The regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(b) provides that the affected party must explain in writing why oral argument is necessary. CIS has the sole authority to grant or deny a request for oral argument and will grant such argument only in cases that involve unique factors or issues of law that cannot be adequately addressed in writing. In this case, no cause for oral argument is shown. Consequently, the request is denied.

In her affidavit the applicant's spouse states that she would suffer extreme hardship if the applicant were not permitted to reside in the United States because she suffers from depression and bipolar disorder. In addition she states that she is under psychiatric care and receives numerous medications for her medical condition. Furthermore she states that there is insufficient medical treatment for her in the Gaza Strip, many houses do not have heat in the winter or air-conditioning in the summer and that she has ". . . no desire to return to the Arabic areas with or without my husband."

Unlike sections 212(g), (h), and (i) of the Act (which relate to waivers of inadmissibility for prospective immigrants), section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act does not specify hardship threshold requirements which must be met. An applicant for permission to reapply for admission into the United States after deportation or removal need not establish that a particular level of hardship would result to a qualifying family member if the application were denied.

There are no laws that require the applicant's spouse to leave the United States and live abroad. In *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F. 2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States." The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represent the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See *Shoostary v. INS*, 39 F. 3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).

The record proceedings reveals that on July 13, 1995, in the United States District Court, District of New Jersey the applicant was convicted for the offense of infringe a copyright in violation of titles 17 U.S.C. § 506 and 18 U.S.C. § 2319 and 2. The applicant was sentenced to four years probation and four months in house confinement.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis of deportation; the recency of the deportation; the length of legal residence in the U.S.; the applicant's moral character and his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; the applicant's family responsibilities; and hardship to if the applicant were not allowed to return to the U.S.

*Matter of Lee*, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] . . . . In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter married his U.S. citizen spouse on November 6, 1997, after he was granted voluntary departure. The applicant's spouse should reasonably have been aware of the applicant's immigration violations and the possibility of him being removed at the time of their marriage. He now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity.

The favorable factors in this matter are the applicant's family tie to a U.S. citizen, his spouse, and the approval of a petition for alien relative.

The unfavorable factors in this matter include the applicant's overstay after his initial lawful admission, his failure to depart the United States after he was granted voluntary departure, his failure to depart after a final removal order was issued, his criminal conviction, his employment without authorization and his lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee*, *supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. His equity, marriage to a U.S. citizen, gained after a removal order was issued can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that he is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.