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


U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



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FILE:  Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: JUN 06 2005


IN RE: Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after
Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.


Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permission to reapply for admission after removal was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole in 1996. On June 12, 1998, the applicant was ordered removed by an Immigration Judge pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for having been present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. The applicant was removed from the United States and she was advised to remain outside the United States for a period of 10 years. The record reflects that the applicant reentered the United States on an unknown date without a lawful admission or parole and without permission to reapply for admission in violation of section 276 the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a felony). The applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). She seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with her U.S. citizen spouse and child.

The Director determined that the applicant was inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of one year or more. In addition the Director determined that section 241(a)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) applied in this matter and the applicant was not eligible for any relief or benefit from his Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission After Deportation or Removal (Form I-212). The Director denied the Form I-212 accordingly. *See Director's Decision* dated September 8, 2004.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general.-Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

. . . .

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

As noted above the record reflects that the applicant was removed from the United States on June 12, 1998, reentered on an unknown date and remained in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. If the applicant accrued unlawful presence she is eligible to file an Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) based on her marriage to a U.S. citizen.

In its August 14, 2004, decision, *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft*, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a Mexican national who returned to the United States following a deportation and had his deportation order reinstated might nonetheless obtain adjustment of status if his Form I-212 was granted. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in *Perez-Gonzalez* that: "Given the fact that Perez-Gonzalez applied for the waiver *before* his deportation order was reinstated, he was not yet subject to its

terms and, therefore, was not barred from applying for relief.” The Court further states: “Prior administrative decisions of the Bureau of Immigration Appeals confirm the fact that permission to reapply is available on a *nunc pro tunc* basis, in which the petitioner receives permission to reapply for admission after he or she has already reentered the country.”

The record of proceedings does not reveal that the applicant’s prior removal order was reinstated at the time she filed the Form I-212. Since this case arises in the Ninth Circuit, *Perez-Gonzalez* is controlling. The applicant is not subject to section 241(a)(5) of the Act.

This office finds that although the applicant is not subject to section 241(a)(5) of the Act, she is clearly inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

.....

(ii) Other aliens.-Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law . . . [and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.]

(iii) Exception. – Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens’ reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the aliens’ reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years for others, (2) has added a bar, with limited exceptions, to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

On appeal the applicant’s spouse states that the applicant takes care of her child at home and is not working. In addition he states that if the applicant is not permitted to reside in the United States their child would suffer hardship and would be deprived of his right to have skills in the English language. Furthermore he states that they have no relatives in Mexico except the applicant’s father who is disabled and unable to walk.

The AAO notes that the record or proceedings reveals that on March 12, 1998, the applicant was convicted for the offense of receiving known stolen property and was sentenced to 365 days imprisonment and three years probation. Based on the applicant's conviction she may also be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis for deportation; recency of deportation; length of residence in the United States; applicant's moral character; his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; family responsibilities; any inadmissibility under other sections of law; hardship involved to himself and others; and the need for his services in the United States.

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would be a condonation of the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter without being admitted to work in the United States unlawfully. *Id.*

Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter married her U.S. citizen spouse on April 21, 2001, approximately three years after she was ordered removed by an Immigration Judge. The applicant's spouse should reasonably have been aware of the applicant's immigration violation and the possibility of her being removed at the time of their marriage. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity.

The favorable factors in this matter are the applicant's family ties to U.S. citizens, her spouse and child, and the approval of a petition for alien relative.

The AAO finds that the unfavorable factors in this case include the applicant's illegal entry into the United States in 1996, her illegal reentry subsequent to her June 12, 1998, removal, her conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and her lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. Her equity, marriage to a U.S. citizen gained after her removal from the United States and her subsequent illegal reentry can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.