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**U.S. Citizenship
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FILE:



Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

Date: JUN 21 2005


IN RE:

Applicant:




APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission after Removal into the United States after Deportation under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.


Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permission to reapply for admission after removal was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and a citizen of the Philippines who entered the United States on September 1, 1992, as a non-immigrant visitor for pleasure. The applicant applied for asylum on January 15, 1993, with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Citizenship and Immigration Services, (CIS)). On April 12, 1993, the applicant was interviewed for asylum status and she was referred to an Immigration Judge for a court hearing. The record reflects that on May 3, 1995, an Immigration Judge granted the applicant voluntary departure until February 3, 1996. The applicant failed to surrender for removal or depart from the United States. The applicant's failure to depart on or prior to February 3, 1996, changed the voluntary departure order to an order of removal. On March 12, 1996, a Warrant of Removal/Deportation (Form I-205) was issued. On June 19, 1998, the applicant married a U.S. citizen who filed a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) on her behalf. On July 27, 2004, the applicant was apprehended and was placed in custody. She was released on her own recognizance on August 26, 2004. The applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). She seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with her U.S. citizen spouse and Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) children

The Director determined that the unfavorable factors in the applicant's case outweighed the favorable factors, and denied the applicant's Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission After Removal (Form I-212). See *Director's Decision* dated July 26, 2004.

Section 212(a)(9). Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain alien previously removed.-

. . . .

(ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.-Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens' reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years for others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief, copies of the applicant's children birth certificates, marriage certificate, her spouse's naturalization certificate and an affidavit from the applicant's spouse. In the brief counsel states that the Director erroneously denied the application and failed to consider and weigh the evidence. Counsel further states that the applicant has demonstrated that she merits a favorable exercise of discretion because she has no criminal record, she has worked continuously to support her family and her spouse and children would suffer emotionally and economically if the application is not granted. The applicant's spouse in his affidavit states that he is very close to his stepchildren and that when the applicant was detained, her children were very depressed and upset. In addition he states that when she was detained he had a tough time meeting his economic obligations and that he lost 10 pounds due to stress and anxiety.

Unlike sections 212(g), (h), and (i) of the Act (which relate to waivers of inadmissibility for prospective immigrants), section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act does not specify hardship threshold requirements which must be met. An applicant for permission to reapply for admission into the United States after deportation or removal need not establish that a particular level of hardship would result to a qualifying family member if the application were denied.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis for deportation; recency of deportation; length of residence in the United States; applicant's moral character; his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; family responsibilities; any inadmissibility under other sections of law; hardship involved to himself and others; and the need for his services in the United States.

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would be a condonation of the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter without being admitted to work in the United States unlawfully. *Id.*

Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter married her U.S. citizen spouse on June 19, 1998, approximately two and one half years after her voluntary departure order had expired. The applicant's spouse should reasonably have been aware of the applicant's immigration violation and the possibility of her being removed at the time of their marriage. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity.

The favorable factors in this matter are the applicant's family ties in the United States, her U.S. citizen spouse and LPR children, and the absence of any criminal record.

The AAO finds the unfavorable factors in this case to include the applicant's failure to depart the United States after she was granted voluntary departure, her employment without authorization and her lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. Her equity, marriage to a U.S. citizen, gained after a removal order was issued can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that she is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.