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FILE:



Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

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
Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after  
Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and  
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permission to reapply for admission after removal was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Nicaragua who entered the United States on or about February 21, 1987, without a lawful admission or parole. The applicant was ordered deported by an Immigration Judge pursuant to section 241(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act). The record of proceedings reveals that the applicant departed the United States on or about April 15, 1997. The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative filed by his U.S. citizen father. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) and seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to travel to the United States to reside with his parents and U.S. citizen child.

The Director determined that the unfavorable factors in the applicant's case outweighed the favorable factors and denied the applicant's Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission After Removal (Form I-212) accordingly. See *Director's Decision* dated September 1, 2004.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

.....

(ii) Other aliens.-Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law . . . [and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.]

(iii) Exception.-Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 IIRIRA amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years for others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

The record of proceedings reveals that on November 16, 1988, the applicant was convicted for driving on a suspended license and driving under the influence. In addition the applicant was convicted twice for insufficient checks/funds under Penal Code of California Section 476(a).

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant does not have any criminal arrest since 1992, a period of over 14 years; he obeyed the order of removal and has resided in Nicaragua since 1997. In addition, counsel states that the applicant, his child and parents would suffer extreme hardship if the application were not granted because of economic, psychological and emotional hardship. Counsel also asserts that the lack of employment opportunities in Nicaragua would not allow the applicant to support his family. Furthermore counsel states that the applicant's child would be forced to abandon her home, school, language and culture, and her opportunities for education, career and advancement would be limited if raised in Nicaragua. Finally counsel states that the applicant had lived in the United States for over 10 years and has family ties and strong roots in this country.

Unlike sections 212(g), (h), and (i) of the Act (which relate to waivers of inadmissibility for prospective immigrants), section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act does not specify hardship threshold requirements which must be met. An applicant for permission to reapply for admission into the United States after deportation or removal need not establish that a particular level of hardship would result to a qualifying family member if the application were denied.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis of deportation; the recency of the deportation; the length of legal residence in the U.S.; the applicant's moral character and his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; the applicant's family responsibilities; and hardship to if the applicant were not allowed to return to the U.S.

*Matter of Lee*, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] . . . . In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would be a condonation of the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter without being admitted to work in the United States unlawfully. *Id.*

The AAO finds that the favorable factors in this case are the applicant's family ties in the United States, his U.S. citizen child, parents and siblings, an approved petition for alien relative, and the prospect of general hardship to his family.

The AAO finds that the unfavorable factors in this case include the applicant's illegal entry into the United States on or about February 21, 1987, his arrests and convictions, his employment without authorization and his lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.