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U.S. Citizenship
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


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FILE:  Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: **MAR 07 2006**

IN RE: Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:


INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permission to reapply for admission after removal was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who on October 19, 1998 attempted to procure admission into the United States by fraud and willful misrepresentation of a material fact. The applicant presented an Alien Registration Card (ARC) that did not belong to him. The applicant was found inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(C)(i) for having attempted to procure admission into the United States by fraud and section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I) for being an immigrant not in possession of a valid immigrant visa or lieu document. Consequently, on October 20, 1998, the applicant was expeditiously removed from the United States pursuant to section 235(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). The record reflects that the applicant reentered the United States on an unknown date but before December 2, 1998, the date of his marriage to his U.S. citizen spouse, without a lawful admission or parole and without permission to reapply for admission in violation of section 276 the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a felony). The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). He seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with his U.S. citizen spouse and children.

The Director determined that section 241(a)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) applies in this matter and the applicant is not eligible and may not apply for any relief and denied the Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission After Removal (Form I-212) accordingly. See *Director's Decision* dated October 7, 2004.

Section 241(a) detention, release, and removal or aliens ordered removed.-

(5) reinstatement of removal orders against aliens illegally reentering.- if the attorney General finds that an aliens has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the aliens is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this Act [chapter], and the aliens shall be removed under the prior order at any time after reentry.

On appeal counsel states:

USCIS is in error to deny the I-212 waiver for factual and legal reasons. USCIS did not review any hard evidence about any purported deportation or voluntary return. Assuming that there was voluntary return, such return is not ipso fact a deportation. Thus, USCIS erred in not finding out for a fact when the return to the United States took place.

There is noting in the record to show that the above alien returned within five years of the voluntary return, if any. Because more than five years have passed since any voluntary return, then the above alien is entitled to a consideration of all the facts to determine any extreme hardship. It is an error for USCIS to simply conclude that the above alien is never entitled to an I-212 waiver. Such conclusion is simply wrong.

The AAO agrees with counsel in some parts of his statements. The record of proceedings clearly shows that the applicant was found inadmissible for having attempted to procure admission into the United States by fraud and for being an immigrant not in possession of a valid immigrant visa or lieu document and was expeditiously removed from the United States pursuant to section 235(1)(B) of the Act. The applicant was not granted voluntary departure. Furthermore the record reveals that the applicant married his U.S. citizen spouse on December 2, 1998, and therefore it is clear that he entered the United States illegally after his removal in violation of section 276 of the Act.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in its August 14, 2004, decision, *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft*, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004), ruled that a Mexican national who returned to the United States following a deportation and had his deportation order reinstated may nonetheless obtain adjustment of status if his Form I-212 is granted. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in *Perez-Gonzalez* that: "Given the fact that Perez-Gonzalez applied for the waiver *before* his deportation order was reinstated, he was not yet subject to its terms and, therefore, was not barred from applying for relief." The Court further states: "Prior administrative decisions of the Bureau of Immigration Appeals confirm the fact that permission to reapply is available on a *nunc pro tunc* basis, in which the petitioner receives permission to reapply for admission after he or she has already reentered the country." Finally the Court states: "... if the alien has applied for permission to reapply in the context of an application to adjust status, the INS is required to consider whether to exercise its discretion in the alien's favor before it can proceed with reinstatement proceedings..."

The record of proceedings does not reveal that the applicant's prior removal order was reinstated at the time he filed the Form I-212. Since this case arises in the Ninth Circuit, *Perez-Gonzalez* is controlling. The applicant is eligible to file a Form I-212.

This office finds that although the applicant is not subject to section 212(a)(5) of the Act, he is clearly inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

.....

(iii) Exception. – Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 IIRIRA amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period

from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years for others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

On appeal counsel states that the documentation submitted is credible and it corroborates all the factors involving extreme hardship. The initial Form I-212 contains a declaration by the applicant's spouse in which she states that she cannot live without her husband because she is psychologically entwined with him; depends on him for help with their two small children, who were born in the United States; depends financially on him because she wants to be a housewife and good mother for their children; is afraid that conditions in Mexico are not suitable for the well being of her family; wants her husband to remain close to her and her children; and wants her husband to be given the opportunity to apply for adjustment of status in the United States.

Unlike sections 212(g), (h), and (i) of the Act (which relate to waivers of inadmissibility for prospective immigrants), section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act does not specify hardship threshold requirements which must be met. An applicant for permission to reapply for admission into the United States after deportation or removal need not establish that a particular level of hardship would result to a qualifying family member if the application were denied.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis of deportation; the recency of the deportation; the length of legal residence in the U.S.; the applicant's moral character and his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; the applicant's family responsibilities; and hardship to if the applicant were not allowed to return to the U.S.

Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred

to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter attempted to enter the United States by fraud, was removed from the United States, illegally reentered and married his U.S. citizen spouse on December 2, 1998, after his removal from the United States. The applicant's spouse should reasonably have been aware of the applicant's immigration violations and the possibility of his being removed at the time of their marriage. He now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity.

The favorable factors in this matter are the applicant's family ties to U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, his spouse, children and siblings, the apparent absence of any criminal record and favorable recommendations.

The AAO finds that the unfavorable factors in this case include the applicant's attempt to enter the United States on October 19, 1998, by fraud, his illegal reentry subsequent to his October 20, 1998, removal, his employment without authorization and his lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. His equity, marriage to a U.S. citizen, gained after he was removed from the United States and after he reentered illegally can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.