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
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FILE:  Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: MAY 27 2005

IN RE: Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permission to reapply for admission after removal was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who on January 18, 1998, attempted to procure admission into the United States by presenting her passport with a fraudulent stamp indicating that permanent residence status had been granted to her. The applicant was found inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(C)(i) for having attempted to procure admission into the United States by fraud and section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I) for being an immigrant not in possession of a valid immigrant visa or other valid entry document. Consequently on January 20, 1998, the applicant was expeditiously removed from the United States pursuant to section 235(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). The record reflects that on January 25, 1998, at the San Luis Port of Entry the applicant again attempted to enter the United States. She was found inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act and she was expeditiously removed for the second time from the United States pursuant to section 235(b)(1) of the Act. The record further indicates that the applicant reentered the United States in March 1998 without a lawful admission or parole and without permission to reapply for admission in violation of section 276 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a felony). The applicant married a U.S. citizen on January 11, 1999, and she is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed by her spouse. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). She seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with her U.S. citizen spouse and child.

The Director determined that section 241(a)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) applies in this matter and the applicant is not eligible for any relief or benefit from his Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission After Removal (Form I-212). The Director denied the Form I-212 accordingly. *See Director's Decision* dated September 9, 2004.

Section 241(a) detention, release, and removal or aliens ordered removed.-

(5) reinstatement of removal orders against aliens illegally reentering.- if the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this Act, and the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.

On appeal the applicant states that, based on a recent Ninth Circuit Court decision, until her reinstatement order is reissued she is eligible for nunc pro tunc permission to reapply and 245(i) relief.

This office agrees with counsel that the applicant is eligible to file a Form I-212. In its August 14, 2004, decision, *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft*, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a Mexican national who returned to the United States following a deportation and had his deportation order reinstated may nonetheless obtain adjustment of status if his Form I-212 is granted. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in *Perez-Gonzalez* that: "Given the fact that Perez-Gonzalez applied for the waiver

before his deportation order was reinstated, he was not yet subject to its terms and, therefore, was not barred from applying for relief.” The Court further states: “Prior administrative decisions of the Bureau of Immigration Appeals confirm the fact that permission to reapply is available on a *nunc pro tunc* basis, in which the petitioner receives permission to reapply for admission after he or she has already reentered the country.”

The record of proceedings does not reveal that the applicant’s prior removal order was reinstated at the time she filed the Form I-212. Since this case arises in the Ninth Circuit, *Perez-Gonzalez* is controlling. The applicant is eligible to file a Form I-212 and the applicant is not subject to section 241(a)(5) of the Act.

The AAO does not have jurisdiction over the applicant’s possible eligibility for benefits under section 245(i) of the Act. The proceeding in the present case is limited to the issue of whether or not the applicant’s inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the Act may be waived.

This office finds that although the applicant is not subject to section 241(a)(5) of the Act, she is clearly inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien’s arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

. . . .

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens’ reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the aliens’ reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years for others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis for deportation; recency of deportation; length of residence in the United States; applicant's moral character; his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; family responsibilities; any inadmissibility under other sections of law; hardship involved to himself and others; and the need for his services in the United States.

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would condone the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter the United States to work in the United States unlawfully. *Id.*

Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter was removed from the United States twice, once on January 20, 1998 and once on January 25, 1998, reentered illegally in March 1998, and married her U.S. citizen spouse on January 11, 1999, approximately a year after her second removal. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. It appears that the applicant's spouse would have been aware of the applicant's immigration violations and the possibility of her being removed at the time of their marriage.

The favorable factors in this matter are the applicant's family ties to U.S. citizens, her spouse and her child, the approval of a petition for alien relative and the absence of any criminal record.

The unfavorable factors in this matter include the applicant's two attempts to gain entry into the United States by fraud, her illegal re-entry subsequent to her January 25, 1998, removal, her employment without authorization and her lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a

positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. Her equity, marriage to a U.S. citizen gained after her removal from the United States and her subsequent illegal reentry, can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.