




U.S. Citizenship
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FILE:



Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

Date: JUN 05 2006

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
Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after
Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without a lawful admission or parole in November 1997. On March 9, 1999 the applicant was arrested for larceny. On March 16, 1999, the applicant was served with a Notice to Appear (NTA) for a removal hearing before an immigration judge and the applicant was released on a \$5,000 bond. On March 23, 1999, an immigration judge found the applicant removable pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(A)(i) for having been present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, and granted her voluntary departure until March 31, 1999, in lieu of removal. The applicant failed to surrender for removal or depart from the United States. The applicant's failure to depart on or prior to March 31, 1999, changed the voluntary departure order to an order of removal. The applicant is the beneficiary of a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed by her U.S. citizen spouse. The applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). She seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with her US citizen spouse.

The Director determined that the unfavorable factors in the applicant's case outweighed the favorable factors, and denied the Form I-212 accordingly. *See Director's Decision* dated September 9, 2004.

Section 212(a)(9). Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain alien previously removed.-

(ii) Other aliens. - Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission reflects that Congress has, (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to

20 years in others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and from being present in the United States without lawful admission or parole.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief, copies of Notices of Action (Form I-797) regarding the approval of Forms I-130 on behalf of the applicant and her two children, copies of tax returns for the years 2002 and 2003, letters of recommendation regarding the applicant's good moral character, and a certificate of achievement showing that the applicant completed a course in computer applications for business. In his brief, counsel states that the applicant was granted voluntary departure and was not ordered removed or deported. In addition, counsel states that except for a single arrest for a minor offense, which was dismissed, the applicant has no criminal record. Counsel further states that based on the documentation presented, the applicant has demonstrated that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones and the Form I-212 should be granted.

Although the applicant was granted voluntary departure, the voluntary departure became a final order of removal because the applicant did not depart the United States prior to the expiration of her voluntary departure order.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis for deportation; recency of deportation; length of residence in the United States; applicant's moral character; his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; family responsibilities; any inadmissibility under other sections of law; hardship involved to himself and others; and the need for his services in the United States.

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would condone the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter the United States to work unlawfully. *Id.*

Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that:

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to

any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v.INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter married her U.S. citizen spouse on March 17, 2002, three years after her voluntary departure order had expired and became a final order of removal. The applicant's spouse should reasonably have been aware, at the time of their marriage, of the applicant's immigration violations and the possibility of her being removed. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity.

The AAO finds that the favorable factors in this case are the applicant's family ties in the United States, her U.S. citizen spouse, and her lawful permanent resident parents and siblings, the approval of a Form I-130 and the letters of recommendation.

The AAO finds that the unfavorable factors in this case include the applicant's initial illegal entry into the United States in November 1997, her failure to depart the United States after she was granted voluntary departure, and after her voluntary departure order became a final order of removal, her unauthorized employment, and her lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. Her equity, marriage to a U.S. citizen, gained after she was placed in removal proceedings, can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.