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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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[REDACTED]

FILE:

Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

Date: **MAR 28 2006**

IN RE:

Applicant:

[REDACTED]

APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after
Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) was denied by the Director, California Service Center and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who, on July 4, 1998, at the San Ysidro, California Port of Entry, attempted to procure admission into the United States. The applicant presented a valid Mexican passport that did not belong to her, containing a fraudulent stamp indicating that permanent residence status had been granted to her. The applicant was found inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(C)(i) for having attempted to procure admission into the United States by fraud, and section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I) for being an immigrant not in possession of a valid immigrant visa or other valid entry document. Consequently, on July 5, 1998, the applicant was expeditiously removed from the United States pursuant to section 235(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). The record reveals that the applicant reentered the United States on the same day she was removed, without a lawful admission or parole and without permission to reapply for admission, in violation of section 276 the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a felony). The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed by her U.S. citizen spouse. The applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) and seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with her U.S. citizen spouse and child.

The Director determined that the applicant was inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of one year or more. In addition, the Director determined that section 241(a)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) applies in this matter and the applicant is not eligible for any relief or benefit from her Form I-212. Finally, the Director determined that the unfavorable factors in the applicant's case outweighed the favorable factors. The Director then denied the Form I-212 accordingly. *See Director's Decision* dated October 13, 2004.

The proceeding in the present case is for an application for permission to reapply for admission into the United States after deportation or removal and therefore the AAO will not discuss the applicant's potential grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act. These proceedings are limited to the issue of whether or not the applicant meets the requirements necessary for the ground of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the Act to be waived.

On appeal, counsel states that the decision was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. In addition, counsel states that the Service committed serious legal errors in contradiction of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent, mischaracterized key facts in denying the Form I-212 and failed to properly weigh the favorable factors against the unfavorable ones. Counsel further states that based on the decision in *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft*, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004), permission to reapply is available on a *nunc pro tunc* basis to an individual after he or she has already reentered the country. Additionally, counsel refers to *Morales-Izquierdo v. Ashcroft*, 388 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 2004) in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the Service does not have jurisdiction to reinstate removal orders and only an immigration judge can reinstate a removal order.

The AAO agrees with counsel in part. Pursuant to *Morales-Izquierdo v. Ashcroft*, in the Ninth Circuit only an immigration judge can determine whether an individual is removable under section 241(a)(5) of the Act. The

Director does not have jurisdiction over the issue of reinstatement. Although in his decision the Director states that a Warrant of Deportation was reinstated, the record of proceedings does not reveal that the Director initiated a Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order (Form I-871) and therefore, the order of deportation has never been reinstated.

In its August 14, 2004, decision, *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft*, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a Mexican national who returned to the United States following a deportation and had his deportation order reinstated may nonetheless obtain adjustment of status if his Form I-212 is granted. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in *Perez-Gonzalez* that: "Given the fact that Perez-Gonzalez applied for the waiver *before* his deportation order was reinstated, he was not yet subject to its terms and, therefore, was not barred from applying for relief." The Court further stated: "Prior administrative decisions of the Bureau of Immigration Appeals confirm the fact that permission to reapply is available on a *nunc pro tunc* basis, in which the petitioner receives permission to reapply for admission after he or she has already reentered the country." Finally the Court stated: "... if the alien has applied for permission to reapply in the context of an application to adjust status, the INS is required to consider whether to exercise its discretion in the alien's favor before it can proceed with reinstatement proceedings..."

Since this case arises in the Ninth Circuit, *Perez-Gonzalez* is controlling. The AAO agrees with counsel and finds that the Director erred in stating that section 241(a)(5) of the Act is applicable in this case.

The AAO conducts the final administrative review and enters the ultimate decision for CIS on all immigration matters that fall within its jurisdiction. The AAO reviews each case de novo as to all questions of law, fact, discretion, or any other issue that may arise in an appeal that falls under its jurisdiction. Because the AAO engages in de novo review, the AAO may deny an application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law, without remand, even if the district or service center director does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See *Helvering v. Gowran*, 302 U.S. 238, 245-246 (1937); see also, *Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003).

Before the AAO can weigh the discretionary factors in this case, it must first determine whether the applicant is eligible to apply for the relief requested. To recapitulate, the applicant was expeditiously removed from the United States on July 5, 1998. The applicant reentered the United States immediately after her removal without a lawful admission or parole and without permission to reapply for admission.

The AAO finds that although the applicant is not subject to section 241(a)(5) of the Act, she is clearly inadmissible under sections 212(a)(9)(A) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act and, therefore, must receive permission to reapply for admission.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent

removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

Section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.-

(i) In general.-Any alien who-

(I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or

(II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other provision of law, and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.- Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States if, prior to the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission. The Secretary, in the Secretary's discretion, may waive the provisions of section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) in the case of an alien to whom the Secretary has granted classification under clause (iii), (iv), or (v) of section 204(a)(1)(A), or classification under clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) of section 204(a)(1)(B), in any case in which there is a connection between—

(1) the alien's having been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty; and

(2) the alien's--

(A) removal;

(B) departure from the United States;

(C) reentry or reentries into the United States; or

(D) attempted reentry into the United States.

An alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act may not apply for consent to reapply unless more than ten years have elapsed since the date of the alien's last departure from the United States. See

Matter of Torres-Garcia, 23 I&N Dec. 866 (BIA 2006). Thus, to avoid inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act, it must be the case that the applicant's last departure was at least ten years ago *and* that CIS has consented to the applicant's reapplying for admission. In the present matter, the applicant's last departure from the United States occurred on July 5, 1998, less than ten years ago. The applicant is currently statutorily ineligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought. The applicant in the instant case does not qualify for an exception under section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) of the Act. Thus, as a matter of law, the applicant is not eligible for approval of a Form I-212. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.