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
Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after
Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen Mexico who entered the United States without a lawful admission or parole in May 1992. The applicant departed the United States on an unknown date and on March 3, 1998, at the San Ysidro, California, Port of Entry he applied for admission into the United States. The applicant presented a photo-substituted Arrival-Departure Record (Form I-94), with a stamp indicating that he had been granted permanent resident status. The applicant was found inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(C)(i), for having attempted to procure admission into the United States by fraud, and section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for being an immigrant not in possession of a valid immigrant visa or other valid entry document. Consequently, on March 5, 1998, the applicant was expeditiously removed from the United States pursuant to section 235(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). The record reveals that the applicant reentered the United States on an unknown date, but prior to May 17, 1998, the date he married a U.S. citizen, without a lawful admission or parole and without permission to reapply for admission, in violation of section 276 the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a felony). The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140). The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). He seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii), in order to remain in the United States and reside with his U.S. citizen spouse and children.

The Director determined that the unfavorable factors in the applicant's case outweighed the favorable ones and denied the Form I-212 accordingly. See *Director's Decision* dated December 5, 2005.

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant is eligible and qualifies for relief pursuant to Form I-212. In addition, counsel states that the Director incorrectly considered, analyzed and decided the Form I-212 and, the factors utilized in the decision were not proper in evaluating the Form I-212. Additionally, on the Notice of Appeal to the AAO (Form I-290B) counsel states that he will be submitting a brief and/or evidence to the AAO within 30 days. On November 27, 2006, the AAO forwarded a fax to counsel informing him that this office had not received a brief or evidence related to this matter and unless counsel responded within five business days the appeal may be summarily dismissed. Counsel has not responded to the AAO's fax of November 27, 2006. The appeal was filed on January 9, 2006, and to date, over one year later, no documentation has been received by the AAO. Therefore, the AAO will adjudicate the appeal based on the documentation contained in the record of proceeding.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.--

(i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent

removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission reflects that Congress has, (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years in others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on deterring aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and from being present in the United States without lawful admission or parole.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis for deportation; recency of deportation; length of residence in the United States; applicant's moral character; his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; family responsibilities; any inadmissibility under other sections of law; hardship involved to himself and others; and the need for his services in the United States.

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would condone the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter the United States to work unlawfully. *Id.*

Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that:

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to

any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter married his U.S. citizen spouse on May 17, 1998, over two months after his expedited removal and after his illegal reentry. The applicant's spouse should reasonably have been aware, at the time of their marriage, of the applicant's immigration violations and the possibility of his being removed. He now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. Therefore, hardship to his spouse will not be accorded great weight.

The AAO finds that the favorable factors in this case are the applicant's family ties in the United States, his U.S. citizen spouse and children, an approved Form I-140, and the absence of any criminal record.

The AAO finds that the unfavorable factors in this case include the applicant's initial illegal entry in May 1992, his attempt to reenter the United States by fraud, his illegal reentry subsequent to his removal, his periods of unauthorized employment, and his lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. His equity, marriage to a U.S. citizen, gained after his removal from the United States and his subsequent illegal reentry, can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish eligibility for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.