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U.S. Citizenship  
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Services

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MAR 22 2007

[Redacted]

FILE: [Redacted]

Office: NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

Date:

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

*Robert P. Wiemann*

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) was denied by the District Director, Newark, New Jersey, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained and the application approved.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without a lawful admission or parole in October 1989. On January 25, 1994, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)) apprehended the applicant and an Order to Show Cause (OSC) for a hearing before an immigration judge, was issued. On June 15 1994, an immigration judge found the applicant deportable, pursuant to section 241(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), for having entered the United States without inspection, and granted her voluntary departure until October 15, 1994, in lieu of deportation. The record reflects that the applicant was granted extensions of her voluntary departure order until November 17, 1995. The record further reflects that the applicant departed the United States on or about April 27, 1996, and, as such, self-deported. The applicant reentered the United States in October 1996 without a lawful admission or parole and without permission to reapply for admission, in violation of section 276 the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a felony). The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed by her Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) spouse. The applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). She seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to in order to remain in the United States and reside with her LPR spouse and U.S. citizen children.

The District Director determined that the unfavorable factors in the applicant's case outweighed the favorable factors and denied the Form I-212 accordingly. *See District Director's Decision* dated December 8, 2005.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

. . .

(ii) Other aliens. - Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission reflects that Congress has, (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years in others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on deterring aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and from being present in the United States without lawful admission or parole.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief in which she states that the District Director's decision was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. Counsel states that the adjudicating officer failed to apply the correct standard of proof pursuant to established regulations and case law. In addition, counsel asserts that the adjudicating officer failed to review all the evidence submitted after the applicant received a notice of intent to deny the Form I-212. Additionally, counsel states that based on case law, a record of immigration violations standing alone does not support a finding of lack of good moral character. Furthermore, counsel states that although case law does not permit "after-acquired" equities to be accorded great weight, the District Director failed to afford any weight to the applicant's spouse and four U.S. citizen children. Counsel adds that the applicant's first child was born before she was placed in deportation proceedings and that although she married her LPR spouse after she was placed in proceedings, her marriage should not be considered an "after-acquired equity" since her relationship with her spouse was clearly established before they were married. Counsel further states that the decision's emphasis on the applicant's departure after her period of voluntary departure expired did not take into consideration that she was attempting to abide by the laws of the United States but was unable to wait for consular processing because of her child's health. Counsel submits copies of the applicant's children's birth certificates, a psychological evaluation, letters from the children's schools, an affidavit from the applicant's spouse, medical records for the applicant's child, a letter from the applicant's employer, copies of tax returns, and documentation regarding country conditions in Mexico.

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter married her LPR spouse on March 24, 1994, two months after she was placed in deportation proceedings. The applicant's spouse should reasonably have been aware at the time of their marriage of the applicant's immigration violations and the possibility of her being removed. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. Therefore, hardship to her spouse will be accorded appropriate weight.

The AAO notes that the applicant provides over 50% of the family's income, and her husband would have a difficult time providing for their children on his salary alone. In addition, the applicant's son has educational and medical issues that need to be addressed in the United States. Furthermore, the record reflects that the family attempted to relocate to Mexico, but the applicant's spouse was unable to find adequate employment to provide for his family, and their son had medical problems that forced them to return to the United States.

Unlike sections 212(g), (h), and (i) of the Act (which relate to waivers of inadmissibility for prospective immigrants), section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act does not specify hardship threshold requirements which must be met. An applicant for permission to reapply for admission into the United States after deportation or removal need not establish that a particular level of hardship would result to a qualifying family member if the application were denied. The AAO will consider the hardship to the applicant's spouse and children, but it will be just one of the determining factors.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis for deportation; recency of deportation; length of residence in the United States; applicant's moral character; his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; family responsibilities; any inadmissibility under other sections of law; hardship involved to himself and others; and the need for his services in the United States.

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would condone the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter the United States to work unlawfully. *Id.*

*Matter of Lee*, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that:

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] . . . . In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

The AAO finds that the favorable factors in this case are the applicant's family ties in the United States, her LPR spouse and children, an approved Form I-130, the prospect of hardship to her family, the letter of recommendation from the applicant's employer, and the absence of a criminal record.

The AAO finds that the unfavorable factors in this case include the applicant's initial entry without inspection, her reentry subsequent to her self-deportation and her periods of unauthorized presence and employment.

While the applicant's actions cannot be condoned, the AAO finds that given all the circumstances of the present case, the applicant has established that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable factors, and that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be sustained and the application approved.

**ORDER:** The appeal is sustained and the application approved.