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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
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U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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FILE: [REDACTED]  
MSC 05 239 14393

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date: **AUG 28 2008**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Handwritten signature of Robert P. Wiemann in black ink.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director determined that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not met his burden of proof and was, therefore, not eligible to adjust to temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements. In pertinent part, the director noted in his decision that the applicant issued a sworn written statement admitting that he first entered the United States in 1986.

On appeal, the applicant states that he became nervous and tense during his legalization interview, submits additional evidence, and states that he has lived continually in the United States since 1981. The applicant asserts that he has established his unlawful residence for the requisite time period, that he is qualified under Section 245A of the Act and the CSS/Newman settlement agreements, and that his application for temporary resident status should be granted.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that he resided in the United States for the duration of the requisite period.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10. The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference

to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The applicant submitted numerous affidavits in support of his application which attest to the fact that the applicant has continuously resided in the United States since 1981. Some of the affiants state that they have personal knowledge that the applicant has resided here since 1981. Other affiants attest to the applicant's residence in this country for a shorter duration, depending upon their personal experience with the applicant. The affidavits submitted, however, are very general in nature and lack sufficient detail to establish that the affiants know and have, or had, an ongoing relationship with the applicant which is sufficient for the affiants to have knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts and/or personal circumstances during the requisite period. As stated earlier in this decision, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. The evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. The affidavits submitted fail to provide detailed information establishing the extent of the affiant's association or relationship with the applicant, or detailed accounts of the affiant's ongoing association establishing a relationship under which the affiant could be reasonably expected to have personal knowledge of the applicant's residence, activities and whereabouts during

the requisite period covered by the applicant's Form I-687. To be probative, affidavits and related proof must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. The proof must be presented in sufficient detail to establish that a relationship does in fact exist, how the relationship was established and sustained, and that the affiant does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. The absence of sufficiently detailed documentation to corroborate the applicant's claim of continuous residence for the entire requisite period seriously detracts from the credibility of his claim. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that the affidavits submitted fail to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States during the requisite period.

The applicant submitted receipts for merchandise and/or services to establish the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. One such receipt was from Toolhaus in Hawthorne, CA, with a handwritten date of April 5, 1981. The date appears to have been altered. Upon investigation by Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), it was determined that the logo on that receipt from the Rediform Company was not used by Rediform until 1984. When questioned about the receipts at his February 17, 1995 interview, the applicant stated that the receipts used by him were given to him to help him qualify for the immigration benefit sought. The applicant stated initially in that interview, that he first came to the United States in 1981. The interviewing officer's notes state that the applicant subsequently admitted, under oath, that he first entered the country in 1986. The applicant then signed a sworn statement to that effect. The admitted use of fraudulent documents by the applicant, and the inconsistency of his testimony as to the date of first arrival in the United States, calls into question the legitimacy of all of the applicant's proof. This is particularly true given the sworn written statement that the applicant made on February 17, 1995 admitting that he first came into the United States in 1986.

The inconsistencies referenced above are material to the applicant's claim as they bear directly on his claim of continuous unlawful residence during the requisite period. The evidence provided by the applicant, therefore, is not deemed credible and is afforded little weight. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the applicant submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. See *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). The applicant signed a sworn statement admitting that he first entered the United States in 1986, which renders him ineligible for the benefit sought. The inconsistencies in the record have not been resolved by independent objective evidence, and the applicant has not established that he has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period. For these reasons, the appeal shall be dismissed.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he has continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.