


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FILE: [REDACTED]
MSC-06-091-14692

Office: National Benefits Center

Date: FEB 11 2006


IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the office that originally decided your case. If your appeal was sustained, or if your case was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.


Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, National Benefits Center. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director determined that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not met his burden of proof and was, therefore, not eligible to adjust to temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements.

On appeal, the applicant submitted additional documentation as evidence of his continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of

continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that he resided in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. Here, the submitted evidence is not relevant, probative, and credible.

The record shows that the applicant submitted a Form I-687 application and supplement to Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) on December 30, 2005. The applicant signed this application under penalty of perjury, certifying that the information is true and correct. At part #30 of the Form I-687 application where applicants were asked to list all residences in the United States since first entry, the applicant reported that he resided in Dallas, Texas from November 1981 until June 1993. Similarly, at part #33, the applicant reported that he was first employed in the United States with [REDACTED] in Dallas, Texas from November 1981 until December 1986. This information indicates that the applicant continuously resided in the United States during the requisite period; however he has failed to corroborate this testimony with credible and probative evidence.

On January 31, 2006, the director issued a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) to the applicant. The NOID provides that the applicant failed to submit documentation to establish his eligibility for Temporary Resident Status. The applicant was afforded thirty (30) days to provide additional evidence in response to the NOID. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6), to meet his burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his own testimony. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of documentation that may be provided to establish proof of continuous residence in the United States during the requisite

period. This list includes: past employment records; utility bills; school records; hospital or medical records; attestations by churches, unions or other organizations; money order receipts; passport entries; birth certificates of children; bank books; letters or correspondence involving the applicant; social security card; selective service card; automobile receipts and registration; deeds, mortgages or contracts; tax receipts; and insurance policies, receipts, or letters. The applicant failed to provide any of these documents in support of his claim of continuous residence in the United States.

An applicant may also submit "any other relevant document." 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). In response to the NOID, the applicant submitted two notarized letters that he signed. These notarized letters provide that the applicant's acquaintances, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], have respectively known the applicant since 1981 and 1985.

In denying the application the director noted that these letters do not indicate whether [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were present in the United States during the statutory period. The letters also fail to indicate whether [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have direct personal knowledge of the applicant's residency in the United States. The director determined that the applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish his claim. The director concluded that based on the lack of evidence, the applicant failed to meet his burden of proof in the proceeding.

On appeal, the applicant furnished two notarized letters signed by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The letter from [REDACTED] provides, "[I] have known [REDACTED] since 1985. Our relationship began while he was working with my dad in the same company in Dallas, Texas. He was very kind and we continue to have a great relationship while [we] both live in Houston and Spring, Texas." The letter from [REDACTED] provides, "[I] have known, [REDACTED] since 1981. Our friendship relationship [sic] began while working at the same company in Dallas, Texas. We continue to have a great friendship and continue to help each other in any way."

The notarized letters from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] do not satisfy the applicant's burden of proof in this proceeding. These letters fail to indicate the extent of their contact with the applicant during the requisite period. The letters state that the applicant worked with [REDACTED] at a "company," without indicating the name and nature of this company. Therefore, these letters can only be afforded minimal weight as corroborating evidence.

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). The applicant has been given the opportunity to satisfy his burden of proof with a broad range of evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3). The applicant submitted two notarized letters to satisfy his burden of proof. These notarized letters are vague and lack considerable detail. The applicant's failure to provide any other evidence to establish his continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period renders a finding that the applicant has failed to satisfy

his burden of proof, as delineated in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5). The applicant has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that his claim is “probably true” pursuant to *Matter of E-M-, supra*.

In conclusion, the absence of sufficiently detailed supporting documentation to corroborate the applicant’s claim of continuous residence for the entire requisite period seriously detracts from the credibility of this claim. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant’s reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that he has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--, supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.