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U.S. Citizenship  
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Services

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FILE:

MSC-05-295-11744

Office: NEWARK

Date:

**JAN 11 2008**

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the office that originally decided your case. If your appeal was sustained, or if your case was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the District Director, Newark. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director determined that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that she had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not met her burden of proof and was, therefore, not eligible to adjust to temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements. Although the director raised the issue of class membership in the decision, since the evidence was considered on the merits the director is found not to have denied the applicant's claim of class membership.

On appeal, the applicant stated that the director's decision was improper, the applicant provided sufficient evidence of her residence in the United States prior to 1981, and the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements did not require the elements that the director suggested.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that she resided in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. Here, the submitted evidence is not relevant, probative, and credible.

The record shows that the applicant submitted a Form I-687 application and Supplement to Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) on July 22, 2005. At part #30 of the Form I-687 application where applicants were asked to list all residences in the United States since first entry, the applicant listed only the following address during the requisite period: [REDACTED], New York, New York from July 1981 to August 1991. At part #32 where applicants were asked to list all absences from the United States since entry, the applicant listed only a trip to Sierra Leone to visit family from November 1986 to February 1987, during the requisite period.

According to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(h)(1), an applicant for temporary resident status shall be regarded as having resided continuously in the United States if, at the time of filing of the application, no single absence from the United States has exceeded 45 days, and the aggregate of all absences has not exceeded 180 days between January 1, 1982 through the date the application for temporary resident status is filed, unless the applicant can establish that due to emergent reasons, his or her return to the United States could not be accomplished within the time period allowed.

Since the applicant's visit to Sierra Leone spanned the complete months of December 1986 and January 1987, it must have exceeded 45 days. The applicant provided no explanation for the delay in her return to the United States. As a result, the applicant is found not to have resided continuously in the United States throughout the requisite period.

In an attempt to establish continuous unlawful residence in this country since prior to January 1, 1982, the applicant provided voluminous documentation, mostly in the form of copies of tax returns and pay stubs. However, only two of the documents provided by the applicant relate to the requisite period. The declaration from [REDACTED] states that the declarant first met the applicant in 1983. However, the declarant also stated that he and the applicant grew up together. The applicant was born in 1957. Since the applicant was approximately 26 years old in 1983, the declarant stated that he met the applicant in 1983, and the declarant also stated that he and the applicant grew up together, this declaration is found to be internally inconsistent. In addition, this declaration fails to confirm the applicant resided in the United States during the requisite period.

The applicant also provided a declaration from [REDACTED]. In this declaration, Mr. [REDACTED] stated that he met the applicant in Sierra Leone. This declaration also fails to confirm the applicant resided in the United States during the requisite period.

In denying the application the director noted that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that she had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period.

On appeal, the applicant stated that the director's decision was improper, the applicant provided sufficient evidence of her residence in the United States prior to 1981, and the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements did not require the elements that the director suggested.

In summary, the applicant has not provided any contemporaneous evidence of residence in the United States relating to the requisite period, and has submitted attestations from only two people concerning that period. The declaration from [REDACTED] is internally inconsistent. The declarations from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both fail to confirm the applicant resided in the United States during the requisite period.

The absence of sufficiently detailed supporting documentation to corroborate the applicant's claim of continuous residence for the entire requisite period seriously detracts from the credibility of this claim. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant's statements indicating she was absent from the United States for more than 45 days during the requisite period, and given her reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that she has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period under both 8 C.F.R.

§ 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.