

identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy


U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000
Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

PUBLIC COPY

L1



FILE: [Redacted] Office: CHICAGO
MSC 06 096 11355

Date: JUL 29 2008

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Michael T. Kelly
162 Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the District Director, Chicago. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director determined that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. Specifically, the director found that the applicant was out of the country for more than 45 consecutive days (from April of 1988 to June of 1990, and from June of 1990 until September of 1993), which represented a disruption of the applicant's continuous unlawful presence during the requisite period for the immigration benefit sought. The director, therefore, denied the application finding that the applicant had not met his burden of proof, and was not eligible to adjust to temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that he has established his unlawful residence for the requisite time period, that he is qualified under Section 245A of the Act and the CSS/NEWMAN settlement agreements, and that his application for temporary resident status should be granted.

The AAO does not agree with the director's determination that the applicant's absences from the United States (4/88 – 6/90 and 6/90 – 9/93) represented a disruption of the applicant's continuous unlawful presence during the requisite period for the immigration benefit sought.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(6)(h)(i) states as follows:

- (h) *Continuous residence.* (1) For the purpose of this Act, an applicant for *temporary resident status* shall be regarded as having resided continuously in the United States if, at the time of filing of the application:
 - (i) No single absence from the United States has exceeded forty-five (45) days, and the aggregate of all absences has not exceeded one hundred and eighty (180) days between January 1, 1982 through the date the application for temporary resident status is filed, unless the alien can establish that due to emergent reasons, his or her return to the United States could not be accomplished within the time period allowed;

....

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10. Thus, any period of absence considered for disruption of the applicant’s unlawful continuous residence must necessarily terminate on or before May 4, 1988, which is the end of the requisite period for the immigration benefit sought. The record does not establish that the applicant was absent from the United States for the length of time necessary to amount to a disruption of his unlawful continuous residence under the above-cited regulation. The requisite period includes the period of time from the applicant’s first entry into the country (to qualify for the immigration benefit sought, the applicant must have entered the United States before January 1, 1982) until the date the applicant was prevented from filing by immigration officials, no later than May 4, 1988). The director’s findings to the contrary are withdrawn.

Despite the error referenced above, however, upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO agrees with the director’s conclusion that the applicant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that she is eligible for the benefit sought.¹

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

As previously noted, for purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn

¹ The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.”); *see also*, *Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO’s *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that he resided in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. Here, the applicant submitted the following documentary evidence:

Affidavits

- [REDACTED]

Each of these affidavits appears on the same type of preprinted form, and contains similar information.

[REDACTED] states in sworn affidavits that the applicant is a nephew, and that the affiant has personal knowledge that the applicant has resided in the United States from April of 1981 till April of 1986, living in Streamwood, IL.

[REDACTED] states in sworn affidavits that the applicant is a nephew, and that the affiant has personal knowledge that the applicant has resided in the United States as follows:

From May of 1986 to April of 1988 in Chicago, Il;

From June of 1990 to June of 1990 in Chicago, Il; and

From September of 1993 to June of 1995 in Chicago, Il.

states in sworn affidavits that the applicant is a nephew, and that the affiant has personal knowledge that the applicant has resided in the United States as follows:

From May of 1986 to April of 1988 in Chicago, Il;

From June of 1990 to June of 1990 in Chicago, Il; and

From September of 1993 to June of 1995 in Chicago, Il.

states in sworn affidavits that the applicant is a nephew, and that the affiant has personal knowledge that the applicant has resided in the United States as follows:

From May of 1986 to April of 1988 in Chicago, Il;

From June of 1990 to June of 1990 in Chicago, Il; and

From September of 1993 to June of 1995 in Chicago, Il.

The applicant indicates on the Form I-687 that he resided in the United States during the requisite periods as follows:

From April of 1981 to April of 1986 in Streamwood, Il; and

From May of 1986 to April of 1988 in Chicago, Il.

Although the applicant has submitted affidavits in support of his application, the applicant has not provided any contemporaneous evidence of residence in the United States during the duration of the requisite period. As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. Although not required, none of the affidavits included any supporting documentation of the affiant's presence in the United States during the requisite period. For example, such documentation could include, but is not limited to, copies of: medical records; school records; real estate/lease documentation; telephone bills; dated purchase receipts; and bank statements. Further, none of the affiants provided detailed evidence establishing how they knew the applicant, the details of their association or relationship, or detailed accounts of their ongoing association establishing a relationship under which the applicant could be reasonably expected to have personal knowledge of the applicant's residence, activities and whereabouts during the

requisite period covered by the applicant's Form I-687. Each affiant stated simply that the applicant was a nephew, and that "the longest period during the residence described in which (s)he has not seen the applicant is 0 (years/months)." No additional details or supporting documentation was provided. To be probative, affidavits and related proof must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. The proof must be presented in sufficient detail to establish that a relationship does in fact exist, how the relationship was established and sustained, and that the affiant does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of facts alleged. The absence of sufficiently detailed documentation to corroborate the applicant's claim of continuous residence for the entire requisite period seriously detracts from the credibility of his claim. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that the affidavits submitted fail to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States during the requisite period.

The additional evidence submitted and listed above does not establish the applicant's presence in the United States during the requisite time period. Taken as a whole, the evidence submitted lacks sufficient detail to establish the applicant's presence in this country during the requisite time period. The absence of sufficiently detailed documentation to corroborate the applicant's claim of continuous residence for the entire requisite period seriously detracts from the credibility of her claim. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that he has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States during the requisite period.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he has continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.