




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
Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained, or if your case was remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Los Angeles. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet (together comprising the I-687 Application). The director denied the application for temporary residence because the applicant could not supply credible evidence of his unlawful presence in the United States for the requisite period of time. The director, therefore, concluded that the applicant had not resided continuously in the United States for the requisite period and was not eligible to adjust to temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements.

The applicant is represented by counsel on appeal. Counsel maintains that the evidence and record submitted are sufficient to establish the applicant's presence in the United States during the requisite period of time. The AAO finds that in denying the application, the director did not properly articulate a clearly identifiable and legitimate basis for the denial. Therefore, the AAO will conduct a *de novo* review of the evidence to adjudicate the application for temporary residence. The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant shall be regarded as having resided continuously in the United States if at the time the application for temporary resident status is considered filed, as described above pursuant to the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, no single absence from the United States has exceeded 45 days, and the aggregate of all absences has not exceeded 180 days during the requisite period unless the applicant can establish that due to emergent reasons the return to the United States could not be accomplished within the time period allowed, the applicant was maintaining a residence in the United States, and the departure was not based on an order of deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(h).

If the applicant's absence exceeded the 45-day period allowed for a single absence, it must be determined if the untimely return of the applicant to the United States was due to an "emergent reason." Although this term is not defined in the regulations, *Matter of C-*, 19 I&N Dec. 808 (Comm. 1988), holds that "emergent" means "coming unexpectedly into being."

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the

director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to meet his burden of establishing continuous unlawful residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. Here, the applicant has failed to meet this burden.

The AAO notes initially that the record before us contains court documents revealing two criminal misdemeanor charges. On January 1, 1987, the applicant pleaded guilty to a violation of California Penal Code section 647(F): *Public Intoxication: Drugs/Alcohol*. The applicant was placed on summary probation for one year. On May 28, 1999, the applicant was charged with a violation of California Penal Code section 243(E)(1): *Battery Against Former Spouse/Fiancé*. The applicant's jury trial on this charge resulted in a mistrial and his motion to dismiss the charges was granted. This single misdemeanor conviction does not render the applicant ineligible temporary resident status pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(d)(1) and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.18(a).

Nonetheless, the applicant stated on his Form I-687 that he returned to Mexico from June, 1987 to September, 1987, because of "Mother's illness emergency trip," an absence in excess of 45 days. No other absence from the United States during the requisite period is listed on the form I-687. The AAO notes that continuous unlawful residence is broken if an absence from the United States is more than 45 days on any one trip unless return could not be accomplished due to emergent reasons. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(h)(1)(i). "Emergent reasons" has been defined as "coming unexpectedly into being." *Matter of C*, 19 I&N Dec. 808 (Comm. 1988). The evidence in the record does not illuminate the nature of the alleged emergency which the applicant appears to state compelled his extended absence from the United States. The applicant's absence between June, 1987 and September, 1987 is well in excess of the 45-day absence limit and therefore disqualifies the applicant from eligibility for temporary resident status pursuant to the settlement agreements. The applicant has not provided any credible, probative evidence that this admission on the Form I-687 is incorrect.

Furthermore, the record indicates that the applicant testified under oath at his interview conducted on November 7, 2006, that he had four departures from the United States to Mexico: from June to July of 1987, from November of 1989 to January of 1990, from February to March of 1990, and from November to December of 1991. The applicant's testimony directly contradicts the information regarding departures listed on the Form I-687 and remains unresolved. Consequently, the evidence is ambiguous as to the applicant's length of absence from the United States during the requisite period.

Ultimately, the applicant's information regarding residence in the United States listed on the Form I-687 is inconsistent with other evidence of record. For example, a photocopy of a return address label dated May 31, 1983 lists the applicant's address as: [REDACTED] Whittier, CA. The Form I-687 lists the applicant's address at that time as: [REDACTED], Los Nictos,

CA. As the applicant has provided inconsistent accounts of his residence for the same periods of time, he has seriously undermined the credibility of his testimony. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the applicant submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the application. *Id.* at 591.

As noted above, to meet his burden of proof, the applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his own testimony, and in this case he has failed to do so. The applicant has not overcome the deficiencies in the evidence noted by the director. Therefore, he has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he has continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period, as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E-M-*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.