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20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000  
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U.S. Citizenship  
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Services

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FILE:

MSC-05-176-11237

Office: NEW YORK

Date: **NOV 21 2008**

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

  
John F. Grissom, Acting Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Field Office Director, New York. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that he has established his unlawful residence for the requisite time period. He submits additional affidavits in support of his appeal.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of

eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). **The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered.** More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. In support of his application, the applicant submitted the following evidence:

- Affidavits from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] All of these affiants state that they have known the applicant since before January 1, 1982. While some of the affiants indicate the circumstances in which they met the applicant, they all fail to provide sufficient details to lend credibility to an at least 24-year relationship with the applicant. For instance, the affiants do not indicate how they date their initial meeting with the applicant, how frequently they had contact with the applicant, or how they had personal knowledge of the applicant's presence in the United States. Further, the affiants do not provide information regarding where the applicant lived during the requisite period. Given these deficiencies, these affidavits have minimal probative value in supporting the applicant's

claims that he entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and resided in the United States for the entire requisite period.

- An affidavit from [REDACTED] who indicates that the applicant lived with him at [REDACTED] York from March 1984 until August 1985, and that the rent receipts and household bills were in the affiant's name and he handled all household expenses. He does not provide any additional information or evidence that substantiates his affidavit.
- Three separate affidavits from [REDACTED]. In each of these affidavits, [REDACTED] indicates that the applicant was his roommate from October 1981 until February 1984 at [REDACTED]. Like the above affiant, [REDACTED] fails to provide any additional evidence that substantiates his claims.
- Several handwritten receipts and envelopes, many undated, containing the applicant's name. Several of the envelopes are illegible. These envelopes provide some evidence that the applicant was present in the United States at various points during the requisite period. However, many are so illegible that they cannot be considered credible evidence.
- A letter from [REDACTED], who indicates that the applicant was treated in his office in December 1981 and again thereafter in 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987.
- An employment letter from [REDACTED] Construction, dated December 5, 1987. The letter indicates that the applicant was employed on a daily basis by the company from July 1982 until February 1986. Although the statement is on company letterhead, it is not notarized. It also fails to meet certain regulatory standards set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i), which provides that letters from employers must include the applicant's address at the time of employment; exact period of employment; whether the information was taken from official company records and where records are located and whether CIS may have access to the records; if records are unavailable, an affidavit form-letter stating that the employment records are unavailable may be accepted which shall be signed, attested to by the employer under penalty of perjury and shall state the employer's willingness to come forward and give testimony if requested. The statement does not include much of the required information and can be afforded minimal weight as evidence of the applicant's residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period.
- Two letters from community organizations. The first letter, from the Muslim Community Center of Brooklyn, Inc., and signed by [REDACTED], indicates that the applicant has been a member of the Center since 1981. This letter does not conform to the statutory requirements for attestations by churches, unions, or other organizations, which is found at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2 ((d)(3)(v). That regulation requires such attestations to "show the inclusive dates of membership and state the address where the applicant resided during

the membership period.” [REDACTED] does not provide dates of the applicant’s membership or any other information that is probative of the issue of his initial entrance to the United States prior to January 1981 or his continuous residence for the duration of the statutory period. Thus, it can be given no probative weight. Further, the applicant failed to list this organization on his Form I-687. The second letter, from The Greater Noakhali Society USA, Inc. indicates that the applicant has been a member of this organization since its founding. Neither the letter from the Muslim Community Center nor the letter from the Greater Noakhali Society USA, Inc complies with the above cited regulation because they do not: state the address where the applicant resided during his membership period; establish in detail that the author knows the applicant and has personal knowledge of the applicant’s whereabouts during the requisite period; establish the origin of the information being attested to; and indicate that membership records were referenced or otherwise specifically state the origin of the information being attested to. For this reason, the letters are not deemed probative and are of little evidentiary value.

The remaining evidence in the record is comprised of the applicant’s statements and application forms, in which he claims that he entered the United States in October 1981, the applicant’s New York driver’s license, employment authorization card, and passport. The applicant has not submitted any additional evidence in support of his claim that he was physically present or had continuous residence in the United States during the entire requisite period or that he entered the United States in 1981. The New York driver’s license, employment authorization card, and passport are evidence of the applicant’s identity, but do not demonstrate that he entered before January 1, 1982 and resided in the United States for the requisite period.

Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO agrees with the director that the evidence submitted by the applicant has not established that he is eligible for the benefit sought.

Beyond the decision of the director, the applicant indicated on his Form I-687 that he was absent from the United States for four months in 1987. For this additional reason, the application may not be approved.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.