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U.S. Citizenship
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Services

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[REDACTED]

FILE:

MSC 02 157 60103

Office: DALLAS

Date: **OCT 12 2006**

IN RE:

Applicant:

[REDACTED]

APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the District Director, Dallas, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application because the applicant had not demonstrated that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988.

On appeal, counsel submits additional evidence and states that the applicant has experienced difficulty in locating more evidence of residency.

An applicant for permanent resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Although Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

While there is no specific regulation which governs what third party individual affidavits should contain to be of sufficient probative value, the regulations do set forth the elements which affidavits from organizations are to include. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3). These guidelines provide a basis for a flexible

standard of the information which an affidavit should contain in order to render it probative for the purpose of comparison with the other evidence of record.

According to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3), a signed attestation should contain (1) an identification of the applicant by name; (2) the dates of the applicant's continuous residence to which the affiant can personally attest; (3) the address(es) where the applicant resided throughout the period which the affiant has known the applicant; (4) the basis for the affiant's acquaintance with the applicant; (5) the means by which the affiant may be contacted; and, (6) the origin of the information being attested to. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v).

In an effort to establish that he resided in the United States during the requisite period of January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, the applicant furnished affidavits from various individuals, receipts, and documents (including a tax return, social security record, and pay statements) indicating that the applicant worked and paid taxes in the United States in 1986. The director did not specify any actual deficiencies in the affidavits or other evidence. She observed, in the Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID), that the "total evidence consists of some hand written receipts and affidavits, none of which are verifiable," and denied the application without further evaluation of the evidence. The record shows that all the affiants identified themselves and provided means by which they could be contacted. The tax documents submitted by the applicant are also verifiable. As stated in *Matter of E--M--*, *supra*, the director cannot refuse to consider affidavits, or any form of evidence relating to the 1981-88 period.

Although it appears that the director failed to consider some of the evidence of residency submitted by the applicant, the AAO finds that the submitted evidence is not relevant, probative and credible. Most of the affidavits submitted by the applicant are from individuals not living in the applicant's state of residence, California, and do not list the address or addresses at which the applicant resided during the affiants' acquaintance with him. The two affidavits that do list the applicant's address during the **period of January 1, 1982** though May 4, 1988, specifically the affidavit dated January 9, 2001 from [REDACTED] and the affidavit dated January 23, 2001 from [REDACTED] list different addresses for the applicant. Neither of these addresses is consistent with the address listed in the applicant's I-687.

Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). The applicant submitted documents containing inconsistencies and failed to explain or reconcile these inconsistencies.

As the applicant has not submitted credible evidence of residency, he therefore has not met his burden of proof in showing that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988. Accordingly, the applicant has not established eligibility to adjust status to Legal Permanent Resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.